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
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
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**WEST EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON  
DEFENSE, DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY**

**Volume III—Spanish Perspectives on Defense, Deterrence and Strategy**

**Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis  
Central Plaza Building  
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Cambridge, MA 02139-3396**

**16 May 1984**

**Technical Report**

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Schools of Strategic Thought  
Spain as NATO's Redoubt  
North African Enclaves

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The institution of democracy in Spain allowed an intense scrutiny of the role of the armed forces in a democratic society. Each political party has tended to align itself with a particular broad political strain present in the European political spectrum. Centrist and rightist parties perceive first of all the Soviet threat and support Allied defense; leftist parties emphasize detente, the dissolution of blocs and the revision or cancellation altogether of the Spanish-American bilateral relationship.

Spanish Atlanticists recognize the threat the Warsaw Pact represents for Spain, and that this could materialize through a Soviet invasion of Europe that reaches the Pyrenees. In this context, Spain is perceived as the rearguard of Europe, as a redoubt from which to project force and to transport help to beleaguered Central Europe and the Mediterranean allied countries. Atlanticists also point out Spanish dependency with regard to overseas sources of raw and vital materials. One distinct concept in this regard is that of the Balearic-Strait of Gibraltar-Canary Islands axis, which is the hinge around which the Spanish defense effort swings, facing threats that may come from three areas: the western Mediterranean, the southern mid-Atlantic and North Africa. One clear military mission for Spanish armed forces, Atlanticists argue, would be the protection of transatlantic convoys.

Strategic thought within the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) is at variance with a number of these precepts. PSOE strategists range from Europeanists who value integration with West Europe at all levels, to National Bilateralists who prefer an independent course, to those favoring unilateral disarmament. Thus, it is hard to find one single text produced by the Socialist press, or declaration of PSOE leaders, in which the Soviet Union is portrayed as a military power intent upon conquering, by force or subversive pressure, Western Europe.

Members of the PSOE left oppose NATO membership on the grounds that it would increase the risk of attacks upon Spain, and would not guarantee Spanish sovereignty over the North African enclaves. The more Europeanist-oriented government has accepted in principle a Spanish contribution to Western defense, although pressures from National Bilateralist elements have led the government to freeze Spanish integration in NATO pending a national referendum on the issue.

Thus, four schools of thought may be differentiated within the Spanish political and strategic community. Members of School I, the Atlanticists, emphasize the concept of collective defense and hence support further Spanish integration in NATO; members of School II, the Europeanists, prefer to link Spanish membership in NATO to a satisfactory resolution of issues related to EEC membership and the future of Gibraltar; while members of School III, the



National-Bilateral School, oppose membership in NATO; finally, School IV members favor unilateral disarmament in connection with a negative perception of the United States.

Under the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), the School II dominated government is unlikely to expand Spain's involvement in NATO in the absence of progress on Spanish accession to the EEC. Moreover, advocates of Schools III and IV within the PSOE will continue to oppose NATO links. Thus, programs designed to promote Spanish contributions to NATO of a more active nature -- such as modernization and integration of Spanish forces within NATO, or their redeployment to the Central Front -- will have to be placed on the back burner for the immediate future. Therefore, attention must be paid to possible Spanish contributions of a more passive nature -- such as provision of staging, logistic and pre-positioning facilities -- that capitalize upon Spain's geographic position, rather than upon its armed forces.

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## SECTION 1

### INTRODUCTION

Before the establishment of democratic institutions, the core of Spanish strategic thought was dominated by the concept of national defense as the protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty against internal and external enemies. According to the prevailing perception, communism represented the primary threat, while Morocco was considered another focus of conflict. Thus, defense was a matter of preventing the emergence of the internal enemy and of thwarting any aggression against the national territory. Political control and protection of the frontiers were the two main objectives. The army, among the three services, was the preferred and hence primary instrument, as it was intrinsically capable of accomplishing both aims. The navy and the air force were only supplementary instruments to provide tactical and general support for the army against any potential external threat, particularly regarding North Africa. This sort of strategic mentality corresponded with a period of the authoritarian regime characterized by political isolation, economic and diplomatic weakness, and a lack of critical analysis, as a consequence of the restrictions on individual freedom.

The authoritarian regime did not, however, stifle all criticism; debate was exercised with considerable openness

on international matters. When the government expected to derive some diplomatic benefits from it, for example, as in the case of the periodic negotiations on the Spanish-American agreements, critics of the agreements no doubt reinforced Spanish diplomatic muscle vis-a-vis the United States.

Parallel to these trends in strategic thought (controlled and extolled by the army and by the Francoist military establishment), a school of thought developed. This school perceived Spain as a maritime nation which had depended on the security of its surrounding seas to protect itself and to exert power through all its modern history. The security of the sea-lanes had been essential to the maintainance of Spanish power in the imperial period, and was critical for maintaining the modernization and industrialization effort of twentieth century Spain. This current of strategic thought was fervently promoted by the navy, thus leading to debate on security matters and challenging the main tenets of the army-backed established doctrine. This perspective helped to put Spain's security in a broader context, and as being intertwined with that of other maritime nations of Europe and America. The outward-looking navy, though politically very conservative and never at variance with the doctrines and deeds of the Franco regime, became wedded to the idea of defense within an alliance of maritime powers. Thus the navy was the first

Spanish service which embraced NATO naval doctrines and procedures, even before the NATO issue was taken up by Spanish political forces.

The relaxation of social controls, which characterized the last years of the authoritarian regime, eased the restrictions and discussion of the most general aspects of defense issues. Later, the institution of democracy allowed an intense scrutiny of the role of the armed forces in a democratic society, thus challenging the central position held by the armed forces in the Spanish body politic. Years of intense debate and, at moments great tensions, led to the clarification of the armed forces' new position. Today the idea that the armed forces can exist only in the service of a democratic and constitutional regime is well rooted, but security objectives and the particulars of Spain's defense posture are less clear.

This is so because the strategic debate, both within the government and concerning public opinion, has not substantially progressed toward the definition of a defense policy which integrates both internal and external factors of security, though the debate on NATO membership revealed and developed incipient perspectives on this issue. Thus, the most relevant legal pronouncement on defense (Article 8.1 of the 1978 Constitution) as well as the pertinent laws on military matters, are formulated in traditional terms; i.e., the constitution says in the above-mentioned article: "The armed forces, constituted by the army, the navy and the

air force, have as their mission to guarantee the sovereignty integrity and the constitutional order." No mention is made of particular Spanish interests or of the defense of alliances to which Spain could freely belong. According to one analyst: "The current model of national defense can be useful. But it is incomplete, not all of its aspects can be put into practice, and it is incapable of attending to all the objectives it is assigned. It thus seems advisable to begin its systematic readjustment." (8, p.42)

The debate aroused by the Spanish accession to the Atlantic Alliance has helped to shake loose some of the basic components of Spanish security perceptions, thus stimulating the orientation of strategic and defense thinking in new directions. It is necessary though to point out two basic deficiencies: (1) diplomacy and defense are not sufficiently integrated in Spanish international policies, as demonstrated by the careful compartmentalization of economic policies (which are oriented toward the EEC) and defense policies (which are not clearly oriented toward NATO); and (2) the strategic debate does not involve the nuclear factor: this is tantamount to saying that it is alienated from the main current of European security concerns.

The modernization of Spanish defense policies can only be obtained through a sustained effort in enlightening

the general public as well as political and military elites. However, human and intellectual capacities for this task are insufficiently developed in Spain. The Spanish "strategic community" is miniscule; its financial basis is negligible; and its dependence on foreign informative inputs is striking. There is a lack of expertise in media defense reporting. The media tends to emphasize the institutional conflicts of certain segments of the armed forces rather than attempting to stimulate the definition of their new potential roles in a democratic Spain which wishes to integrate with Europe. These deficiencies are compounded by the lack of sufficient foreign language abilities among the more educated segments of society. Given these institutional, intellectual and material drawbacks, it is not surprising that Spanish international policies carry an air of ambiguity characterizing Spain's rapport with the United States and the European countries.

This introduction leads to an analysis of Spanish security issues which are structured in such a fashion as to allow:

1. The identification of the major security issues facing Spain today and those likely to arise over the next several years, with special emphasis on European security and the Atlantic Alliance, as well as Spanish perspectives on other issues of importance to Spain;
2. The comparison, contrast and categorization of the major foreign policy/national security decision-makers and elites in Spain, including politicians, academics, journalists and military personnel;



3. The assessment of the implications of Spanish security perspectives and governmental policies for the bilateral U.S.-Spanish relationship, NATO and Western Europe.

## SECTION 2

### MAJOR SECURITY ISSUES FACING SPAIN

#### 2.1 A Historical Hindsight

Security perceptions in today's Spain are still conditioned to a very large extent by historical experiences which have created particular features of Spanish political culture. Spain as well as Portugal were the first European powers to carve out an empire of global reach. Spain itself exercised political and military hegemony in Europe during the sixteenth century. Its power declined somewhat during the seventeenth century to become one of the European "great powers." Spain held this position until the Napoleonic period during which the country was reduced to a lesser status among the European states. Later, revolutionary ideals caused the loss of its American colonies and introduced internal strife. Modern national consciousness was formed in line with the impressions that both military aggression and subversive ideas came from abroad. Isolation was the final result of those experiences. The Spanish-American War of 1898 produced a dual effect: on the one hand it reinforced the isolationist tendencies that pervaded nineteenth century political and social life; and on the other it gave birth to a cultural reawakening which had modernization and "Europeanization" as its two main

banners. However, these two currents did not coincide exactly with any political cleavage between progressive and conservative forces, since both banners were raised one way or the other by almost all political forces, and even by the two factions that fought the civil war.

Spanish elites of the first quarter of this century tried to redefine Spain's international role in conciliation with the prevailing European system. This design portrayed Spain as a Mediterranean power whose interests lay in the demarcation of a zone of influence in the North African colonial system. Spain had been present in the Maghreb for some centuries as an imperial power and there it returned through the concession made by other European powers (France and Britain), as one of the two "protector" countries of Morocco. The protectorate was established after a protracted and bloody conflict, which in turn led to the development of the Spanish army. It was this army that fought the war labeled "africanista," implying the highly professional, combative and nationalistic nature of the war. It was the uprising of the Spanish "African" army which ignited the rebellion that spread throughout Spain in 1936. In the first third of the twentieth century, Spanish military preparedness was relatively high; military industries were able to supply almost all kinds of armaments and equipment available at that time; its navy was one of the largest in Europe; and its utilization of airpower was used in battle even before the First World War (in Morocco).

The nationalist forces of the civil war identified their real enemy as "international communism," which used a constellation of puppet forces (democratic parties, liberalism, masonry, anarchism, socialism, etc.) to destroy the spirit of Old Spain. The fact that the Spanish Civil War became a cause of contention for Europe created the impression among nationalist forces that preserving a Spain free of communism was a great European cause. Totalitarian pro-Axis forces identified themselves as "true Europeans" fighting for European ideals, and those sectors of society and of the armed forces that favored the Allied powers also viewed themselves in a similar way. Yet this basic Europeanism did not alter the widespread perception that Spanish interests lay in neutrality. Therefore, nationalism, Europeanism and neutralism were all ideals that the established political and social forces embraced.

Neutrality, however, taught Spain the consequences of political and military weakness. The end of the Second World War meant total political isolation for the Franco regime, which did not show any willingness to slacken political control, although it saw its legitimacy weakened by economic difficulties. It was mainly the backward economic situation, during Europe's reconstruction, which prompted Franco to accept U.S. help in exchange for Spanish military concessions. The 1953 base agreement gave the regime the external political support it needed to carry on

without changing its nature. Franco portrayed the agreement as the Spanish contribution to the cause against communism, although in fact he did not see the bilateral pact primarily as a way of countering Soviet threats against Spain but as a way to strengthen the legitimacy of his rule. He and the Spanish military were not pursuing security in a European context, but instead with regard to internal political control. Thus, while the virtues of neutrality had been disproved by economic isolation, the virtues of nationalism were confirmed with anticommunism. Because security and defense problems were dealt with by the United States, they remained remote from Franco's concerns.

While there was an underlying perception that Spain could remain removed from any military confrontation that might affect Europe, there arose nonetheless the need to consider potential threats to Spain when the decolonization process began in the Maghreb. Spain decolonized the Moroccan protectorate in 1956, and then saw its possession of Ifni (an enclave in southwest Morocco) attacked the next year. The perception of threat concerning that region was based also, to a large extent, on historical experiences, mainly the high cost of establishing the protectorate in Morocco. With the passing of years, the impatience of Moroccan nationalism created renewed problems for Spain, regarding claims of sovereignty over the Tarfaya strip (between Western Sahara and post-colonial Morocco), over the whole of the Western Sahara and over the Spanish enclaves of

Ceuta and Melilla. Transfer of sovereignty over the first was negotiated in 1958; Ifni was almost totally occupied by Moroccan forces until retrocession was negotiated in 1969; and the Western Sahara claim was settled through an agreement reached after extreme pressure had been exerted against Spain (through the so-called "green march" of November 1975). The unilateral extension by Morocco of its Atlantic territorial waters to 70 miles in 1973 caused great alarm in Spain because it affected traditional Spanish fishing rights. Present Moroccan policy of restricting the use of its waters by Spanish trawlers, accompanied by frequent seizures of fishing boats, exacerbates reactions against what is seen as Moroccan curtailment of Spanish interests. Political developments in Algeria also contributed to the Spanish perception of the Maghreb countries as a source of instability. Excessive revolutionary zeal on the part of the first independent Algerian government led to a challenge to Spanish national interests and rights on the Canaries during the first years of the Western Sahara conflict, while Algeria supported a puppet "independence movement" hosted in Algiers.

All that political trouble was perceived as dangerous and destabilizing, thus reinforcing Spanish misgivings about the Maghreb as a potential threat (which were never quite defined in military terms). The "threat from the South" is a constant feature of Spanish security policies. This feature can be discerned in the political platform of the

Partido Socialista Obrero Espanos (PSOE) or in the Joint Strategic Plan (Plan Estrategico Conjunto) (PEC), which guides military policies and force objectives. However, that "threat" has never been made explicit by anyone with responsibility on defense matters. Military ideologues in Franco's time spoke with alarm of the "national ambitions of Morocco," though Franco himself used to dismiss these worries, referring to them as "cosas de los moros." This supposed "threat from the South" has never been put into a broader international context or analyzed in terms of East-West confrontation.

Perceptions of other threats were conspicuously absent from Spanish strategic thinking in the sixties and the seventies. The Soviet threat concerned Central Europe, not the Iberian Peninsula, situated in the point of Europe farthest from the Iron Curtain. Devoid of that necessary input, Spanish security policies were not worth the name. There was interest to improve military equipment and eagerness to obtain more advanced weapons systems from the United States, but there was no serious attempt to put defense and security in an organic and structured framework. These concerns were left to a small group of officers not held in high regard by the armed forces' command. The pervading attitude among the services in Franco's time was "give us the little money you will allow us and leave us in peace." This suited Franco perfectly.

This neglect of military and security matters applied to every aspect of defense: requests for military equipment from the United States were made separately by each service, leading to duplication and incompatibility; while access to the Rota base for U.S. strategic submarines was extended by the Vice President of Spain as a personal initiative without the knowledge of the Foreign Minister. The regular meetings of the Spanish and Portuguese general staffs were held under strict instructions not to tackle any serious problem or to solve anything of substance, as trouble would allegedly arise if Spain attempted to establish a defined and determined policy because the Portuguese would supposedly confuse offers to cooperate with attempts to meddle in their internal affairs. France enjoyed substantial prestige among the Spanish armed forces, who were content with undertaking joint maneuvers with French forces and purchasing sophisticated French equipment. Also, the Spanish armed forces looked to the United States for inspiration and equipment without fully absorbing the implications of the American presence in Europe for collective defense. It was only natural that this lack of intellectual orientation or stimulus from institutions interested in defense pervaded public attitudes toward security in a political climate of strict control of news and information. The public at large was made to perceive no threat and the political elites remained oblivious to security concerns.



The social unrest that characterized the sixties in Spain (a period of rapid economic growth) and the first incidents of terrorism late in the decade sensitized the armed forces and the political establishment to the internal aspects of security. Stricter and more professional social and political control was sought: indoctrination of the armed forces against subversion, irregular warfare and "indirect strategies" (in the French interpretation of this concept) was so intense in the early seventies that it seemed Spain would be carried away by the all-encompassing "doctrine of national security" which characterized contemporary politico-military developments in Latin America. Thus the notion of internal security as the first national concern was revitalized by the Franco regime. It was mitigated only by skillful political conduct during the transition period, but only because the King (Franco's chosen heir) was at the helm and the institutional evolution was never ruptured. The consolidation of democracy was punctuated by grave tensions between the military and the governments of Sr. Suarez (which exploded in the failed coup d'etat of February 23, 1981).

The aggravation of terrorism during development of the democratic process made it impossible to dispel the concerns about internal security as something central in Spanish policies. Thus terrorism is identified (by numerous political forces) as the primary challenge to Spanish security. However, the more open political climate has

brought public attention regarding the problems of European and Western defense to the forefront. This has helped to renovate threat perceptions in a fashion more attuned to that of Western Europe. However, it cannot be maintained that defense and security concerns have become a matter of serious and crucial debate. Thus, even though Spain became a member of NATO in June 1982, the concept of collective defense does not permeate the officer corps' professional thinking, especially in the army. This is particularly true concerning the army, and while the navy and the air force are NATO-oriented in matters of doctrine and operation, the army's resistance inhibits their inclination toward the Alliance.

Another stimulus for public awareness of the importance of security matters was that represented by the ideological orientations of the major Spanish political forces. Each party tended to align itself with a particular broad political strain present in the European political spectrum. Centrist and rightist parties perceived first of all the Soviet threat and supported Allied defense; leftist parties emphasized detente, the dissolution of blocs and the revision or cancellation altogether of the Spanish-American bilateral relationship. Though the PSOE refused to participate in public debate on the NATO issue before Spain decided to apply for membership, it did not avoid the parliamentary debate against it. The Communist Party of Spain (PCE) did not shy away from the public debate, coming out strongly

against NATO membership and backtracking from its former position of supporting the continuation of the Spanish-American bilateral agreements. At the same time the then governing party, Union de Centro Democratico (UCD), neither led a forceful debate nor attempted to inform the public on the merits of its decision to join the Alliance.<sup>2</sup>

Independent writers and the media played a critical role throughout this period by calling public attention to defense issues. Yet, while all military and defense matters have become newsworthy, reporting on these matters is frequently biased one way or the other, or plainly incompetent. It must be recognized also that there is a conscientious pursuit of more cooperative efforts among writers and journalists, on the one hand, and professionals of the armed forces, the political bodies and the very small "strategic community," on the other.

Summing up all these reflections one can make the following points:

1. Neutralism has waned but not disappeared from Spanish national consciousness.
2. There is a confused identification of the Maghreb area as a source of potential conflict.
3. There is no strong, clear public perception of a direct Soviet threat to Spain, although the public identifies itself on this issue according to general ideological alignment. Those embracing liberal democratic ideals certainly see a general threat against Western democratic societies, while extreme rightists share this view but disavow any democratic leaning.

4. The general perception that the internal threat is graver than anything that could possibly come from beyond Spanish frontiers has been justified by the rapid increase in terrorist activities in the period of consolidation of the new democratic institutions.

The strategic debate within Spanish society is only beginning its takeoff; it has the potential to grow into a mature search for diplomatic and military answers to Spanish security problems. The parameters of that nascent strategic debate are outlined below.

## 2.2 The Joint Strategic Plan

The Plan Estrategico Conjunto (Joint Strategic Plan) (PEC) is the centerpiece around which revolves the organization of the Spanish defense effort.<sup>3</sup> Theoretically, it is drawn up, at the request of the Minister of Defense, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor) (JUJEM); the request is accompanied by the Directiva de Defensa Nacional (National Defense Directive), which reflects the government's defense and military policies. The PEC, when formulated, is presented to, and approved by, the government. In order to derive the PEC, the JUJEM must fix the Joint Force Objective (Objetivo de Fuerza Conjunto) or force level. This force level is established in consultation with the services' chiefs of staff, following the Directiva Para el Planeamiento de la Fuerza (Force Planning Directive), which gives the criteria to determine the

necessary forces. When each chief of staff formulates his service's requirements to fulfill the directive, the JUJEM fixes the joint force objective; then the PEC is presented to the government in the form of a request for the necessary appropriations.

When the government gets the parliament's approval for the necessary funds, then it can be said that the "defense cycle" (el ciclo de la defensa) is complete. Periodically the "cycle" is revised, updated and reformulated to enhance efficiency. This cycle would seem rational if it started at the top by the formulation of the government's defense and military policies and conducted full circle to its conclusion by governmental approval and parliamentary allocation of funds. The Minister of Defense, Sr. Narciso Serra, announced on November 14, 1983, that "in the first three or four months of 1984 the full defense cycle will be completed for the first time."<sup>(35)</sup> Yet it is legitimate to question whether this cycle is as rational as he claimed, since it lacks the guiding element -- governmental defense policy -- which is not yet formulated.

Specifically, the defense policy of the present government is not satisfactorily defined since it is not known whether the defense of Spain must be conceptualized in terms of collective defense, that is, whether Spain will remain in NATO. The government's decision on this is in stasis pending the results of a consultative referendum it proposed for 1985. Meanwhile, the first defense cycle has

gone from bottom to top, rather than developing from top to bottom.

### 2.3 The Referendum on NATO

The PSOE opposed NATO membership in the program formulated at its 27th Congress, when it approved a policy of neutrality. (1, p.295) Then the party opposed the centrist government's decision in 1982 to join the Alliance as "unessential"; afterwards, when Spain had joined the Alliance, the PSOE committed itself to call a referendum on the issue if it won the general elections of October 28, 1982. Though the government is still standing by its promise, it is reviewing the potential domestic and international consequences of the referendum.

Referenda, according to the Spanish constitution, can only be of a consultative nature; the government is not bound by any particular result. The referendum on NATO has become one of the ritornelli of Spanish politics and press editorializing. PSOE's followers and the Communist Party constantly urge the government to initiate it; the press constantly focuses on this matter. The government position was stated by President Gonzalez when he announced in Washington on June 21, 1983, that the referendum would be called "within one and a half to two years' time." By that time some important international problems should be resolved. One of them would be the deployment of INF or its

reduction/cancellation through negotiations;<sup>(14)</sup> another one would be that of Spanish accession to the EEC. Sr. Gonzalez is attributed the belief that a satisfactory application of the "dual-track decision" and a positive resolution of the EEC membership question can help the government bring about a response to the referendum favorable to the continuation of Spanish membership in NATO. His Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sr. Fernando Moran, though, apparently favors an earlier referendum date, implying opposition to NATO membership. Two days before Sr. Gonzalez made his announcement, Moran said, "It is not a matter of one and one-half to two years. The reasonable date would be that of the Euromissile deployment," which would bring the referendum forward to 1984. Thus, as it lacks the important input represented by a final decision on whether Spain will have an allied or independent defense, it is very difficult for the first defense cycle to constitute the definite doctrine guiding Spanish defense and military policies.

#### 2.4 From Bottom to Top

The PEC story is one of pragmatism rather than one of faithful application of theory. It began from scratch, with the navy lending the first building materials. This has something to do with the fact that the navy is the promoter of a strategic analysis that departs from the conventional

wisdom of Franco's times, and of the "African army", for which defense amounted to the territorial control of the country. It also has something to do with the fact that it was the navy that had already most fervently embraced NATO doctrines.

In 1978 the navy formulated its Plan General de la Armada (Navy General Plan), a document which established the principles on which force structure should be based; it set out the organic features of the service, its composition, the force level, the personnel statutes, training the promotion procedures, and the shipbuilding plan. It also made inchoate the perceptions of the probable threats with which the navy would be confronted in a crisis. It identified the potential sources of threats, among them the possible claims by Morocco on tracts of sea over which Spain had rival claims, threats to Ceuta and Melilla, and the general risk represented by the Soviet maritime forces. It was the first time that a Spanish armed service undertook such a comprehensive task aimed at formulation by the government of its official policy. The other two services were still guiding themselves by the disparate body of regulations and plans they had been allowed in keeping with the Franco regime's indifference toward modernization and professionalization of the armed forces.

It was under the urging of the Minister of Defense and Vice President, Lt. General Gutierrez-Mellado, who had been working on military reform since the early seventies in



the team led by Lt. General Diez-Alegria at the Alto Estado Mayor, that the two other services formulated their general plan, later integrated in a group of documents acquiring the aspects of a quasi-PEC. Gutierrez-Mellado created the Ministry of Defense in 1978 out of the three service ministries and set up the JUJEM. This is the superior organ of the armed forces' chain of command. It is presided over by a chairman, although he does not enjoy command authority over the other three members of the JUJEM, the chiefs of staff of the army, navy and air force. When it was created, the hierarchical relationship between the armed forces and the government was not formulated in unequivocal terms, so the JUJEM enjoyed great autonomy in its endeavors to increase the integration of the three services' plans and to formulate a strategic perception. It was through inputs represented by the three services' general plans that the JUJEM was able to prepare its PEC. This document has already been presented to the King, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and to the Junta de Defensa Nacional (National Defense Board), and brought to the government for approval. It has not been approved as of November 1983; it probably will be in 1984.

Though the document is secret, some of its features and characteristics can be derived from official literature on the subject and from the public exchange of views on the more general problems of defense by those who have read it. It seems that the PEC assumes that a country such as Spain

cannot determine its national strategy; rather, this is imposed on it by the international environment. Spanish defense policy must therefore be adapted within a larger strategic context. The PEC incorporates the perception of a threat originating in Northern Africa, represented by Moroccan claims or interference with Spanish sovereignty by the Maghreb countries. The PEC also identifies the threat the Warsaw Pact represents for Spain, which could materialize through a Soviet invasion of Europe that reaches the Pyrenees. This notion reflects the army's typical approach to defense and to the protection of the Spanish territorial sanctuary since, for the army, the Pyrenees are the first line of defense in a European conflict.

Threats can also materialize on the high seas, in the air and against Spanish shores and sea-lanes of communication. The PEC apparently points out Spanish dependency with regard to overseas sources of raw and vital materials; more than 90 percent of Spanish trade utilizes vulnerable sea routes. The Spanish geographical position involves other inherent threats. Spain is separated from Africa only by a few miles of Mediterranean waters. A threat to its territory could come from a potential Soviet presence or bases in one of the Maghreb countries, while potential conflicts in the western Mediterranean could infect it.

The prominent geographical position of Spain along the Strait of Gibraltar and its approaches subjects the country to the risks of conflict involving its control,

while non-innocent transit is another problem, especially concerning passage by strategic submarines. The Strait's waters, especially those of its western mouth, might be sown with offensive mines. These risks are compounded by the fact that the British (from the Spanish perspective) keep an unwanted military base in a point so crucial for Spanish security.

One distinct conception of the PEC is that of the "Eje Baleares-Estrehco-Canarias" (Balearic-Strait of Gibraltar-Canary Islands Axis), which is the hinge around which the Spanish defense effort swings, facing threats that may come from three areas: the western Mediterranean, the southern mid-Atlantic and North Africa. It is along this axis that Spain focuses its military effort.

The PEC contemplates cooperation with the Western and Allied countries in an emergency or war. In this context Spain is perceived as the rearguard of Europe, as a redoubt from which to project force and to transport help to beleaguered Central Europe and the Mediterranean allied countries. One clear military mission for Spanish armed forces, mainly the navy and the air force, would be the protection of transatlantic convoys. Due account is taken by the PEC of the NATO plans for defense of critical areas, two of them being the Atlantic approaches to southwestern Europe and the Mediterranean. The PEC also takes into consideration NATO mobilization plans. Transport by NATO of up to 1.25 million men and 10 million tons of supplies is a

task demanding all the escort capacity the Spanish navy can provide for protection of convoys from the mid-Atlantic to Sicily in cooperation with allied forces. Antisubmarine warfare is a primary responsibility of the Spanish navy in this area. Intrusion by Soviet surface combatants in the approaches to Spanish shores are unlikely, although air power projected from the Iberian Peninsula and the Canaries must take this risk into consideration.

Another likely feature of the PEC is its indication that subversion still represents a major threat to Spanish security. Terrorism presumably occupies a significant place in the PEC's list of perceived threats.

## 2.5 The Strategic Debate Illustrated

Trends in the strategic debate preceding the inception of the PEC illuminate the perspectives it incorporates. One typical exponent of the army's strategic thought is a high-ranking officer who publishes articles in the Madrid newspaper YA under the pseudonym of Juan de Espana.\* He wrote in December 1982:

(T)he fundamental priority of our defense is territorial integrity and Spanish sovereignty. It is also by chance that this is a priority not only for us but also for NATO. From an objective military perspective, what NATO is most interested in getting from us (even more than our integration) is not for us to be able to send units to this or that place, or for us to satisfy

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\* He is General Juan Cano Hevia, who in 1983 served as Director of Escuela Superior del Ejercito.

illusions of prestige within the military organization of the Alliance, but rather that in the case of a catastrophe and the collapse of Europe, for Spaniards to offer a guarantee to preserve the Peninsula for the West. Our primary defensive interest does not conflict with that of NATO.(10)

De Espana's emphasis is in the noncontradiction between Spanish security interests and those of the Alliance. It is very rare to find among army authors a more positive attitude vis-a-vis the Alliance. Generally, for these writers the perception of national interests is conditioned by habits of thought, doctrinal mindset and corporate aspirations. Though the same is true of the naval writers' attitudes, one finds among them an outlook more congenial with collective defense and more closely compatible with Alliance interests. Two complementary examples of naval strategic thought illustrate this perspective:

The definition of [the Spanish] area of conflict can be reduced, by simplification, to the Balearics-Strait-Canaries axis, demonstrating that its center of gravity is the Strait and its points of support are in the Atlantic and Mediterranean archipelagos. In the framework of this axis is included the concept of a defensive system against threats that may come from the Mediterranean and North Africa, not only as a result of Maghrebi tension, but also through Soviet penetration of this southern flank, in whose defense Spain as well as Europe and the West are interested.(11)

. . . the southern region of Europe constitutes the underbelly of the West, the much discussed southern flank of NATO, which the Warsaw Pact tries to debilitate by all means, especially through an indirect strategy that particularly bears one way or the other on the political conditions of the littoral or quasi-littoral states on this sea; this is supported by a naval

presence which is each day more intense in quality as well as in quantity. In opposition, the Alliance [has a strategy which is] strictly defensive in character, in accordance with its nature, and attempts to prevent the outflanking of Western Europe through this soft southern underbelly. It is clear then that the actions of the Alliance and the presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet only pursue preventive-defensive ends to guarantee that the "Mare Nostrum" does not become "Nashe Mare."(12)

## 2.6 Defensive Strategy Within the Alliance

It must be observed that the main doctrinal body behind the PEC was elaborated with Spanish membership in NATO held in mind. This was made clear when the JUJEM declared its support for joining the Alliance, before the parliamentary debate about the decision was to start. No doubt this distinct pro-NATO imprint still inspires the document though the JUJEM carefully reserves its judgment about the Socialist Government's decision to put the issue to a referendum. One defense analyst has described Spanish security needs in the context of allied defense:

The present [1982] Spanish strategy and that which can be foreseen for the immediate future is only defensive. This means that the long-adopted posture of Spain of renunciation of the use of force as a means of resolving foreign policy problems is maintained . . . Defensive strategy means that the Spanish armed forces will intervene only in response to a violent aggression against the territory of Spain or its interests. So, the analysis of this strategy must start with that of the possibilities of those types of aggression.(8, p.49)

The author states that these threats come from: "(1) the Warsaw Pact versus the whole Western bloc, to which Spain

will belong from the day of its entry in NATO; and (2) the Maghreb, by way of Morocco, alone or allied to Algeria, with the objective of occupying Ceuta and Melilla." The first threat is improbable but highly dangerous, while the second is more probable and much less dangerous. In NATO general strategy, a major tenet is that "NATO always be capable of controlling the maritime routes that link North America with the Western European allies." In that naval strategy the Spanish contribution could relate to the extraordinary importance for the Atlantic organization of the Strait of Gibraltar as well as the control of the maritime routes of the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The Spanish army could find a renewed utility in the context of the redeployment of Spanish units to the central front and to reinforcing the defense of the Pyrenees.<sup>(8, pp.49-58)</sup>

Although very little is known of the Defense Minister's military thought, some inklings can be discerned from that which he has said in public. He believes that a "deterrent capacity is a component of national sovereignty"; and that "Spain should pursue a defense policy of integration in Europe."<sup>(35)</sup> He has demonstrated great dedication to the implementation of military policies that were outlined by former governments and consistently proposed by the armed forces' reformists who had been operating from within the military from the early seventies. He seems to have introduced some systematicity to a process that had a dynamic of its own, while adding a touch of boldness and

another of cost-mindedness. He is not known, however, for having defended the doctrinal assumptions on which defense and military reforms have been propounded and executed during the last few years (he even rejects the term "military reforms"). One of those assumptions was that the natural course of Spanish progress in matters of security and defense was to join the Alliance at a certain stage decided by political forces.



## SECTION 3

### THE PERCEIVED THREATS

From what we have said until now it is possible to infer that one may categorize Spanish threat perceptions. Frequent mention has been made of the internal and external threats. Practically, the internal threat is reduced to that of terrorism. This perception is similar to that of Franco's time, when communist subversion was regarded as the main danger facing modern Spain. It has been revalidated recently by the rampant increase in terrorist activities against democratic Spain and by the political challenge implicit in those acts.

The external threat has two origins: the irredentist aspirations of Morocco against Spanish territories on the one hand, and the general Soviet threat to the West on the other, including in this category any move against the southern flank of NATO launched from a postulated Soviet military presence in Northern Africa. A description of the nature and scope of each threat to Spain will now be elaborated.

#### 3.1 Terrorism

Three terrorist groups have appeared in Spain during the last 15 years. The oldest and strongest one is ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Country and Freedom); the

second to appear and weakest was FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Armado Popular) while the third is GRAPO (Gropas Revolucionarios Armados Primero de Octubre, Armed Revolutionary Groups of the First of October, named for the date of their first terrorist attack, involving the assassination of a policeman).

FRAP killed several policemen while claiming to be a national liberation front. It was infiltrated by the police and dismantled. GRAPO was a much stronger group, with clear Marxist-Leninist leanings. It committed numerous assassinations -- among them those of several generals -- and kidnappings. Though most of its activists were detained or killed, some are still at large, and from time to time they commit new attacks. They are said to have some support in marginal social sectors of northwestern and southern Spain.

ETA is very much alive and seems to be capable of surviving very strong police pressure and political isolation. It is the only terrorist group that can count on a large social and political backing, though this is concentrated exclusively in the Basque region, and particularly in a valley between the provinces of Guipuzcoa and Navarra. ETA was born in the mid-sixties as a political nationalist group. It was originally the radical offspring of the old Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and the result of nationalistic indoctrination by sectarian elements of the Basque church. At first it saw itself as a national liberation front, but it later became a Marxist organization, which

has suffered many internal divisions. Each ETA Assembly was the occasion of internal strife and divisions, producing different ETA factions. The most active ones today are ETA V Asamblea (or ETA Militar) and ETA VIII Asamblea (ETA Politico-Militar). This last branched off from ETA VII Asamblea, the old ETA Politico-Militar, which combined terrorist attacks (that avoided great bloodshed) with political action. ETA VIII Asamblea is the group of the "polis-milis," as they are called, that refused to abandon their clandestine nature in 1982, resorting ever since to bloody acts of terrorism. ETA Militar is recognized as a Marxist-terrorist group pursuing the construction of an independent and socialist republic of Euzkadi. It is the branch that has committed most of the assassinations.

All ETA groups maintain an important economic activity: they impose on wealth people, industrialists and professionals of the Basque country what is called in "im-puesto revolucionario" ("revolutionary tax"), regularly paid clandestinely to ETA agents. Many of these payments are made in the French Basque country. Another source of income is ransom for kidnapped persons: each year there are six or seven kidnap cases. Bank holdups were the usual means of acquiring funds in the late seventies, but they have become more risky today. However, banks are said to be under "revolutionary tax" blackmail; if they do not pay, their branch offices are blown up. Such attacks account for a substantial portion of ETA activities.

Assassinations are committed with some selectivity. Guardias Civiles and National Policemen are natural and frequent targets; army or navy officers, both in the Basque country and the rest of Spain, are a sensitive target to be hit at politically significant moments, with the apparent goal of producing a strong anticonstitutional reaction by the armed forces, weakening Spanish democracy. Retired officers and Guardias Civiles, individuals suspected of cooperation with the police, civil officials and leading members of national conservative parties have also been murdered. For some time the ETA generally did not hit individuals with nationalist inclinations. The devolution of powers of autonomy to the Basque government has helped to alienate Basque terrorists from Basque nationalists; thus, there have recently been cases of kidnappings of the PNV.

All branches of ETA count on a relatively broad social base of support. Basque separatist parties that give their support to ETA obtained 152,000 votes in the electoral coalition formed in 1980 in the Basque parliamentary elections. (If we add one independent party which embraces nonviolence, the total separatist vote is around 230,000.) Those supporting ETA represented 11 percent of the Basque and Navarra electorates. Active mass support for ETA has been explicit in the frequent demonstrations which take place in the Basque region, the largest of which occurred in 1977 and was attended by 60,000 people. Since then numbers have significantly dwindled.<sup>(19)</sup> The political force

which supports ETA (Herri Batasuna, a coalition) has an attributed core of around 10,000, of which around 3,000 are estimated ready to participate in street violence.<sup>(19)</sup> It is through this sort of mobilization that ETA probably recruits its members.

The number of killings related to ETA activities has rapidly increased with democratization. There were less than 20 assassinations throughout Franco's period, while from June 1968 to April 1982 ETA killed 349 people and wounded 492. Of the dead, 140 were uniformed policemen and 25 plainclothes ones; 32 were military (army or navy); and 152 were civilians. In that period, 64 ETA terrorists were killed, of which 2 were executed and 12 assassinated by "uncontrolled groups." ETA suffered another 4,000 "casualties" by arrest and escape into exile.<sup>(19)</sup>

How many people compose ETA? "One organization that produces more than 300 assassinations, which has been in existence for more than twenty years and that maintains a support organization which can be calculated at well above 150,000, and which maintains more than 500 people in exile, cannot be a small organization," says the Guardia Civil chief of intelligence.

It is prudent to recognize that the ETA maintains permanently in its commando ranks all the men it needs because, unhappily, it has the necessary political clientele. It is difficult, however, to estimate its size without more foundation than certain rough data, including its capacity to raise economic resources and to establish emigre colonies in Venezuela, Mexico and France, all controlled by an executive committee and a highly complex and compartmentalized direction system. To gauge the ETA's strength at 500 men might not

be inaccurate, though it would be more accurate to think in terms of around 200 armed men, divided between 20 or 30 "full time" members (ilegales) and the rest "part time" (legales).(19)

This analysis seems to imply that ETA, or at least its most powerful branch, ETA Militar, is highly centralized, dispelling the conventional idea that ETA is a loose organization where spontaneity and lack of organization is the guarantee of its vitality and resilience. "I can assure you that behind ETA there is somebody who plans," said the director general of the Guardia Civil recently.(32)

Taking all things into account, ETA has produced less casualties than has the IRA. Why is it then that terrorism is such a concern for government and armed forces alike?

Several factors account for this:

1. ETA's provocative killings of high ranking officers has produced an evident destabilizing effect. It should be remembered that terrorism was one of the alleged motives behind the February 23, 1981 coup attempt. One opinion poll conducted by the navy in November 1983, immediately after an army major was assassinated in Vizcaya province, showed there was a majority in favor of military intervention in the Basque region; the publicity by the press to this poll caused great embarrassment to the government.
2. Basque terrorism has spread throughout Spain. There have been terrorists attacks (killings and bombings) primarily in Andalucia and Madrid.
3. ETA has threatened to attack all military targets (barracks, munition depots, weapons testing grounds, Guardia Civil living quarters, etc.) and there are many more attempts on those targets than are reported in the media.

4. Political forces backing ETA have received active support in their attempts to disrupt important economic programmes. Mass mobilizations followed by two sensitive assassinations helped to paralyze and ultimately to thwart the construction of the nuclear power plant in Lemoniz. This caused great damage to business confidence in the viability of the Basque economy and created in the government a conditioned reflex (fear to carry through policies that displease Basque extremists) which has weakened its prestige and caused great social unrest in other regions of Spain because of its economic consequences.
5. Basque nationalist sentiment, united with separatist activism and opportunistic acts of terrorism, causes grave tensions within the Spanish and regional Basque governments. This state of affairs is demoralizing and causes great concern among social sectors whose experience is that democracy means little more than political trouble.
6. The armed forces fear, not without foundation, that Basque nationalist claims may one day challenge some basic tenets of the central government's authority, such as the universality of military service. This is spurred by the refusal of PNV-run autonomous government and local councils to hoist the Spanish flag in their buildings, and by the voices which have been heard in the Basque nationalist press: "The Basques are forces to swear fidelity to a flag and to defend a country that is not ours." (20) Meanwhile, Herri Batasuna has staged actions against registration for military service.

Independent of the challenges Basque terrorism presents to Spanish internal security, another dimension of the problem is that the Basque region sees its grave economic problems (obsolete industries, high unemployment, natural disasters, etc.) aggravated by terrorist activity. The three Basque provinces, once the most prosperous and

industrialized of Spain, have declined both in production and per capita income. While the national GNP grew 15.39 percent between 1973 and 1979, that of the Basque region decreased by 5.56 percent, its per capita income decreased by 17.64 percent in the same period, while that of Spain as a whole grew by 5.70 percent. The unemployment rate in the Basque region was well below the national level in 1976, but was much higher than the national level in 1981.<sup>(40)</sup>

Though it is hard to prove that terrorism has contributed to the economic decline of the Basque region, two factors support this hypothesis. One is the massive transfer of industries to other regions with a more hospitable political climate; the other is the refusal of the Spanish banking community to help the government to finance the recovery program devised to support the Basque region. This concerned mitigating the disastrous effects caused by the August 1983 floods, with 50 billion pts. in credits; the government finally forced the banks to yield by decree.

The shutdown of the almost finished Lemoniz nuclear plant, in the process of the nuclear plan review undertaken by the government in 1983, presumably because the plant had been the target of many terrorist attacks, caused losses of \$1.5 billion and hundreds of jobs. There is a widespread perception in the Valencia region (eastern Spain) that the government's decision to close down its Sagunto steel mill is unfair, because the government had given in to Basque



pressure not to close down the Bilbao steel mills. This suspicion is justified by the fact that several independent reviews favored Sagunto vis-a-vis Bilbao. Social and political unrest has now made its appearance in Valencia, with mass demonstrations now held more frequently there than in the Basque region.

### 3.2 Moroccan Territorial Claims

Morocco claims sovereignty over the cities of Ceuta and Melilla (at the western and the eastern ends of its northern coast), and over a number of small islands (Penon de Velez, Penon de Alhucemas, and the Chafarinas Islands, comprising two square kilometers of territory), scattered along the northern coast. Ceuta had been Portuguese since the fifteenth century, but was taken over by Spain in 1640 and formally ceded to it by Portugal in 1668. Melilla had been conquered by the Catholic Kings in 1497. Penon de Velez was conquered in 1508; Penon de Alhucemas was occupied in 1673; and the Chafarinas Islands were taken in 1848. Several treaties between the Spanish Kings and the Moroccan Sultans recognized Spanish sovereignty over these territories; the 1860 Treaty recapitulated all previous acts of recognition.

From the very birth of Moroccan independence in 1956, sovereignty over these Spanish possessions has been an objective of all Moroccan political forces and especially of

the Cherifien Monarchy. In a meeting with General Franco in 1963, King Hassan served notice that he aspired to absorb the two cities, but noted that the claim would only be raised in the final stage of the long decolonization process Morocco foresaw regarding Ifni, Tarfaya, Western Sahara and territories in the newly independent Algeria.

Morocco has made every effort to accomplish its program of "territorial integrity." This has involved attacks against Tarfaya and Ifni, a war with Algeria (1963), occupation of the Western Sahara (1975), and war against the Polisario Front (1976-83). Force has not yet been used against Ceuta or Melilla, although different forms of pressure have been exerted, including border closures, trade boycotts, levies on visits to the new cities, occasional bombings, etc. With a very large Moroccan population in Melilla (perhaps 50 percent), and a significant although much smaller one in Ceuta, the two cities contain substantial Spanish garrisons. They have divergent economic situations: Ceuta is a bustling trade center, benefitting from the intense commercial traffic through the Strait of Gibraltar, while Melilla's main source of income is that generated by the garrison and services of the central administration. Thus, while Ceuta has around 100,000 inhabitants, Melilla has seen its population dwindle from the 80,000 of a few years ago to the present 40,000. Also, it is faced with the neighboring Moroccan city of Nador, whose population has recently grown from around 20,000 to

80,000, thanks to its new port, which has drawn much commerce from Melilla. The Spanish government has followed the policy that any child born in either of the two cities may obtain Spanish nationality, although many Moroccan women go to give birth in Melilla because of its superior medical facilities. Thus, a new generation of Spaniards of Moroccan origin are now entering military service age.

From a strategic perspective, Spain maintains control over the group of small islands along the Moroccan shores because they serve as observation outposts between the two cities, despite the fact that this function has been made obsolescent by modern military technology. Military experts believe that while Melilla would be difficult (although possible) to defend from a Moroccan attack, Ceuta is more defensible, owing to its proximity to the Spanish mainland.

Though Morocco has not formally entered Ceuta and Melilla before the United Nations as decolonization cases, it has notified the Committee of 24 that it wishes the organization to support its claim over the two territories. This claim has also been pursued before the Organization for African Unity, whose Council of Ministers expressed in February 1975 "total solidarity with the Kingdom of Morocco for the reintegration of the colonial enclaves of its Northern coast." This declaration preceded by one year the Madrid settlement of February 1976, by which Spain transferred the administration of the Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. The so-called "Madrid Treaty" has

conditioned all political and diplomatic dealings between Spain and Morocco. Technically, Spain is the former colonial power whose administrative duties, not sovereignty, have been transferred to Morocco. Spain has steadily maintained the policy of not recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over any part of the Western Sahara in the absence of a plebiscite. Meanwhile, Morocco is careful not to strain relations with Spain for fear that it would disavow Moroccan administration of the territory as not being conducive to the self-determination of the Western Saharan people.

Therefore, Morocco is unlikely to press for a solution of the problem of Ceuta and Melilla before the Western Sahara question is satisfactorily settled. However, King Hassan has voiced his preferred solution by suggesting that "one day, England, logically, will return Gibraltar to Spain. If it does this, Spain should return Ceuta and Melilla. The sooner the Spaniards get Gibraltar, the earlier we will get, automatically, immediately, Ceuta and Melilla."<sup>(5)</sup> He noted ominously, "No power can allow Spain to keep the two keys of the same strait."<sup>(5)</sup>

In the meantime, Spanish-Moroccan cooperation is very intense in armaments and in military intelligence. The rapprochement is based on historical links and stimulated by the clear U.S.-Moroccan rapprochement initiated by the Reagan Administration. The United States has also been encouraging Morocco towards a policy of cooperation with

Spain. A result of this encouragement and of Spanish diplomatic efforts was a meeting between the Kings of Spain and Morocco in Mallorca on February 24, 1982. There have been reliable reports that the talks between the two monarchs were of a security nature; there were speculations about King Hassan's proposing "a strategic understanding" to King Juan Carlos. According to one Moroccan analyst:

I believe it was a strategic consultation, an exchange of views on this issue, even if the Spanish King's constitutional powers are not the same as those of the Moroccan King. The so-called "Moroccan-Spanish strategic area" is not an isolated element, but enters into the framework of a global strategy defined by Washington . . . It would be a mistake to reduce the Moroccan-North American rapprochement and the Moroccan-Spanish one to a particular dimension; it is necessary to see them within a global North American vision which wants to create glacis, as it used to be said in the old cold war theory. (7, p.198)

The circumstances under which Morocco's claims on its northern border could lead to conflict was clearly described by the present Foreign Minister when he was in the opposition

The clearest scenario for potential tension between a European country and a North African one, with the possibility of a conflict, would concern the potential reabsorption by Morocco of Ceuta, Melilla and the Penones. The reactivation of the Moroccan claim in a significant manner may be derived from a cold calculus of [Morocco], which is unlikely while the Sahara issue is pursued through local military confrontation and through diplomacy, which, in and of themselves, appear to be incapable of solving the problem.

He adds that the claim might also be reactivated if Morocco were to suffer a military defeat in the Sahara, which

would produce first a crisis for the regime and afterward a strengthening of Nasserite nationalism; it might also be reactivated after a military and diplomatic victory, caused by decisive Western support. (7, pp.63-68)

### 3.3 The Soviet Threat

It is hard to find one single text produced by the Socialist press, or declaration of PSOE leaders, in which the Soviet Union is portrayed as a military power intent upon conquering Western Europe by force or subversive pressure. Those expressions are simply not in the Socialist literature and much less so in its doctrine. Sr. Fernando Moran sees the Soviet Union as a country that overreacts to its perception of military and technological inferiority vis-a-vis the United States:

The transition from Stalin to Khrushchev meant the transition from a regional vision to a global one, and from a clearly defensive attitude -- after the expansion in the late forties in the East -- to a policy simply of rhetorical aggression. (42, p.127)

However, Socialist leaders like to be presented as sufficiently savant to realize that the Soviet Union and world communism represent a threat to European values. Sr. Gonzalez is attributed with the phrase, "I prefer to run the risk of getting killed in the New York metro to living in Moscow." Vice President Sr. Alfonso Guerra has reportedly said, "I will say anywhere that in Cuba there is no freedom;

that there the official language is Russian; Havana is a suburb of Moscow." (17)

Apparently they have faced up to Soviet realities from the days when Sr. Felipe Gonzalez, in the name of the PSOE, signed a declaration with the CPSU in Moscow (December 1977), committing the PSOE to resisting the aggrandizement of military blocs. The PSOE earnestly maintained this antibloc attitude (although the Soviet Union is, of course, head of one of the blocs) up through the 1982 electoral program, in which it announced that a Socialist government would suspend the process of military integration in NATO pending a referendum on the issue.

Blocs, according to Sr. Moran, tend to draw benefits from globalizing local or regional conflicts, that is, from placing them, and forcing regional actors to be placed, in the context of the broader East-West conflict. For Moran, this can be discerned in the Maghreb, and more clearly in Central America:

U.S. reaction against the Cuban reality means the introduction of the Cold War into Latin America . . . Later developments -- Tupamaro or Montonero urban guerrillas and the current revolutionary movements, beginning with Sandinismo -- cannot be connected with periods of the Cold War nor with communist global strategies. (42, p.387)

The Government has been very cautious about introducing value judgments into its assessment of the international situation, when the Soviet Union is involved. Strong words were used by Sr. Moran when the Korean airliner was shot down, but Spain refused to join other European nations

in applying sanctions. Yet, rather than trying to read government pronouncements on the Soviet Union, and its political and military intentions, it is more useful to examine the positive pronouncements that seem to bind Spain to the defense of the West. As tersely stated by Sr. Moran in a recent article (1983):

Spain, by vocation, history and intrinsic composition, is a Western country and finds in the West her traditional field of action, her long-term friends, her natural milieu. This is why I wish to repeat the words I pronounced in Paris on June 9, 1982: this long and, at times, difficult period of revision of our position will never prejudice nor harm the profound historical ties of friendship and cooperation which exist between the Spanish nation and the countries of Europe and America.(39)

He adds that Spain wants to honor, fully and unequivocally, her international commitments:

Spain will, in this respect, fulfill all the obligations which derive from her position as a NATO member and, as long as she continues to be a member of the Alliance, the rest of the signatories of the Treaty of Washington can be assured that my country will be a loyal ally and exact in the fulfillment of its obligations. Spain does not want to conduct an ambiguous foreign policy.

Sr. Moran announced in the December 1982 NATO Council meeting in Brussels that the Spanish government planned to conduct a detailed study of Spain's defense interests and alternative means to guarantee Spanish national security.

For the time being nonpartisan literature on the subject of the Soviet threat is very scarce. However,



two significant pieces of literature stand out. One refers to the potential maritime threat that can be exerted against Spain; the other, to the threat relating to air space. These two texts were presented to a seminar on "Spanish Security Options" organized by the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales (INCI) in April 1980. According to the first, given Soviet strategic and naval priorities, and

. . . if the war becomes prolonged, that is, if the Soviet blitzkrieg is halted somewhere in NATO territory for military, political or perhaps a combination of both reasons, resupply from North Africa will become a major factor in the war's course and outcome . . . To interrupt Western resupply efforts, Soviet forces are very likely to intensify planned mining and submarine operations in the waters of Northern Europe and, to the degree they are capable, in the waters of the Bay of Biscay southward to the Strait of Gibraltar and in the Western Mediterranean. Whether the Backfire force will be committed in substantial numbers during the conventional phase of such a campaign is difficult to predict. If it is, its initial targets are likely to be Western naval and port facilities, especially those equipped to handle container ships, and, of course, Western naval forces assigned to convoy defense. More southerly routes for transatlantic convoys would reduce the threat from Soviet land-based aviation and submarines. Such routing, should it be adopted, will of course further increase the importance of the Canary Islands. It goes without saying that the Azores and Madeira are as crucial to the struggle in the Atlantic as Gibraltar and the Balearics are to the control of the Western Mediterranean. The Iberian Peninsula itself could serve as the terminus of transatlantic convoys or provide the basis for air and antisubmarine defense of convoys en route to more northerly and easterly destinations. (6, pp.5-6)

The second piece addresses itself to these two questions:

(1) Is Spain vulnerable to military attack?; and (2) are there lucrative targets on the Iberian Peninsula in any

event? The first question may be answered by stating that according to the target and to the battle requirements a whole range of weapons could be employed:

. . . radars or communication facilities emitting radio energy might be attacked with missiles or aircraft equipped with homing devices and high explosive munitions. If the objective of the attacker is to neutralize or deny use of a particular facility for a limited period of time, then chemical agents might be selected. If an attacker believes a particular target to be time urgent or to cover a large area, then nuclear weapons might be employed. (9, pp.8-9)

As for the second question:

If there is any prospect for the use of Spain's and Portugal's air bases and seaports for the reinforcement of Europe in the event of an attack by Warsaw Pact forces, the Soviets may perceive that these facilities are important to attack so as to interfere with or delay the air-lifting or sea-lifting of troops and equipment from the United States and Canada to Europe. If the Soviets were to carry out more extensive operations, particularly with aircraft, Spanish air defenses might be attacked. If the Soviets viewed the elimination of Western naval power in the Mediterranean as important, then naval support installations in Spain and Portugal might be attacked. (9, p.9)

### 3.4 Military Readiness

Many of the weapon acquisition programs the Spanish military has under way are attuned to the above-mentioned threats. The Spanish armed forces are undergoing a profound transformation which will make them more powerful, more mobile, more modern and more compact. The main programs are tailored to a variety of threats, particularly those that

come from the Soviet bloc or North Africa, and that involve defense against a multitude of military threats. It is not possible, however, to determine whether any of these programs is designed to cope with chemical and nuclear munitions, as opposed to conventional forces. A brief review of the high priority programs may serve to illustrate the nature of the threats they are designed to deter.

#### 3.4.1 Army

Top priority has been given to antiair point defense; \$200 million is going to be invested in the acquisition of relevant weapon systems in 1984. Three systems are being considered: Crotale, Rapier and Roland. The other high priority is acquisition of a new battle tank; old (although modernized) M47s and M48s are to be replaced. The more modern AMX-30 has demonstrated some major deficiencies, while the German Leopard II is being carefully studied as the probable choice for acquisition. Also, the French AMX-32 is an alternative.

#### 3.4.2 Navy

The top priority is to flesh out a "combat group" with a new aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias (under construction) and three new FFG frigates. The group will incorporate the ASW system LAMPS III (6 helicopters) and VTOL aircraft AV8-B (12). Also the navy is considering the

possible construction of a nuclear-propelled submarine and has decided to purchase SS Harpoon missiles.

### 3.4.3 Air Force

Procurement of 72 F-18As has been top priority in connection with the purchase decision taken by the government in mid-1983. They will replace the old F-4 planes; thus, the air force will comprise F-18As and French Mirage F-1s. Another likely case for replacement in the near future is the F-5.

The Ministry of Defense will spend 250 billion pesetas (about \$1.65 billion) for maintenance and equipment in 1984, according to an estimate made by the Minister.<sup>(35)</sup> Significantly, Spain ranked first in U.S. fiscal year 1983 among the states that purchased weapon systems from the United States. Apart from the acquisition of modern weapons, the armed forces will be subjected to many organic reforms. The army will be cut by 90,000 men; its 40,000 professionals will be reduced by 30 percent in the next few years. The number of generals will be drastically reduced, while unified and specified commands will be created and reinforced.

### 3.5 The Study Group and the NATO Issue

The study that the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced to his colleagues of the Atlantic Council is being

carried out by an informal group of military personnel, diplomats and other officials. Those responsible for security policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the formulation of military policies at the Ministry of Defense are included. The group works without a prearranged agenda. One member described its task as that of helping the government determine its position in matters of national security. Thus, a broad range of considerations can be brought up by the members.

The study group has faced two basic difficulties in its work. (1) Members realize there is a general lack of experience in this sort of comprehensive approach to security matters that have policy-related components, which need intelligence inputs that might never have been requested previously, and require the acquisition of new areas of expertise (such as diplomacy for the military and technical military skills for the civilians). (2) Many disparate factors have to be integrated in several documents or one composite, including policy alternatives, security options, guidance and counsel, etc., as the government had not made any specific requests of the working group at least through November 1983.

The Spanish President has publicly referred to the study group at least once. In June 1983, while in New York, he said that from the study that is being carried out about Spanish defense needs, some coincidence with the defense posture of the Alliance might result:

Evidently the degree of coincidence is greater in countries such as West Germany, as possibly 95 percent of its defense needs correspond with those of the Alliance, thus explaining its degree of integration. We are never going to arrive at that level, and for that reason our degree of integration can be less.(24)

No doubt the analysis of potential threats to Spain will be one of the main concerns of the study group. Whether its members are able to change substantially or to refine established perceptions is another matter. These perceptions are the result of many years of study and experimentation, of allowing inert prejudices to trickle down to the hardened minds of military organizations and unchallenged assumptions in public opinion. It is very doubtful that the group can contribute to a substantial reorientation of Spanish military thought and of the conventional-strategic wisdom. As has been seen, the basic inclination of the established strategy and threat perception is towards the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, there is every likelihood that the study group will serve to rationalize the reasons why Spain should remain in the Alliance.(36) Whether the government will follow such advice is a totally different matter. There is certainly a distinction between the private and public positions of various ministers. It is not rare to hear ministers and secretaries of state saying that NATO is not after all the bogey some of them portray it to be in public. But none of them has dared to take up the challenge by the Vice President when he said last July:

I believe Spain should not be in NATO, that it should withdraw. There are many people who do not think it should, but they only say so in restricted circles. If there is anybody inside or outside government, or critics, that think otherwise, they should speak out.(26)

His statement seemed to refer to several Ministers, including those for Defense and Economy, for example, as well as the Secretary of State for Relations with the EEC. However, the statement of the Vice President only elicited speeches by four Ministers in favor of withdrawing, and none by those in favor of remaining. Those who spoke out based their remarks on the bible of party wisdom, the 29th Congress Program (of October 1981), which based its opposition to Spanish membership on four grounds:

1. NATO does not guarantee Spanish territorial integrity because the North Atlantic Treaty excludes part of Spanish territory from the Atlantic defensive system.
2. NATO does not cover Spanish security and defense needs, given the risk and threat in theaters beyond the area contemplated in the Treaty.
3. Participation in NATO means an increase in the risks of nuclear destruction of the Spanish people.
4. Spanish adherence to NATO would provoke the other bloc's reaction, involving the strengthening or enlargement of the Warsaw Pact, an increase of tension and of the risk of war.

With the first argument, the Socialists point out that NATO does not protect the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla from Moroccan encroachment. The implication of the second point is that Morocco is the only likely threat to

Spain. The third point is self-explanatory. The fourth is the official expression of the old Socialist tenet, maintained by the party experts even before Spain joined the Alliance, that by becoming a member, Spain would destabilize the European balance and encourage the other bloc to enlarge.



## SECTION 4

### OTHER SECURITY-RELATED ISSUES

The foreign policy of the Spanish Socialist Government is ambitious, and, to a certain degree, aggressive; Socialists are proud to be labelled "young nationalists." Their policies are well structured. Policies are adopted because they follow an established directive which is based on a certain point of the party's program. The principles inspiring all foreign and defense objectives are clear:

The new government of the nation will, without further delay, set about implementing a foreign policy that will strengthen Spain's role in the concert of nations, affirm our presence on an equal footing wherever national interests are at stake, and enable our country to make an active contribution to the cause of peace, freedom, justice and progress in the world.(40)

Such a foreign policy would be based on the following principles: "Respect for law as the organizing principle behind international coexistence, strengthening the role of the United Nations, and the search for peace, disarmament and detente, endangered by the revival of the policy of blocs."

The substance of such high-flown international policies is quite another matter. There is a pervading perception of the failure of some spectacular initiatives the Socialist Government has launched since its inception.

The most striking one is the collapse of their hope that ideology would represent a tremendous boost to their policies, as exemplified by the continuous erosion of relations with France and the impasse in relations with socialist-run Portugal. When the Spanish Socialists arrived in power they promised to reverse both situations. Much was made of the fact that in Paris and in Madrid there were two ideologically similar governments. The Foreign Minister put great personal weight behind a policy of close cooperation with France; but sadly enough, by the end of 1983 the Spanish government was considering retaliation against France in commercial terms for its hindrance of Spanish accession to the EEC and because of the safe shelter Spanish terrorists find in French territory. The ideological pairing with Portugal also failed when this country refused even to consider the idea of closer economic cooperation with Spain in anticipation of joining the EEC. Despondent with using ideology as their sea-compass, Spanish Socialists are veering towards yet uncharted territories, in little keeping with the neutralism, "internationalist," pacifist and pro-Third World outlook of their party progress. A concise review of Spanish foreign policies on a variety of issues will provide a more precise appreciation of the limits and constraints that are altering substantially the Socialist Government's attitudes.

#### 4.1 European Security

For Sr. Fernando Moran, the adjournment in Madrid of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) without a collapse of that institution means "the reinitiation of detente," as he labeled it in September 1983. The incumbent Socialist Government decided in late 1982 to follow the same policy of alignment with NATO countries in this conference inaugurated by the UCD government three years before, when Spain was not yet a NATO member. The Spanish delegation took an active approach in trying to end the impasse reached in March 1983 because of the 14 amendments presented by the Western states for the final document of the conference. These amendments were considered unacceptable by the Eastern countries. Moran, with the support of the neutrals, strove for a solution which was in keeping with the proposals made on July 15 by Gonzalez for a compromise in the form of a final document including some of the minimal demands the West was making on the question of human rights. Summing up Spanish diplomatic experiences at the conference, Sr. Moran commented: "Within the Alliance there is total freedom; it is possible to be 'Western' and at the same time autonomous."<sup>(27)</sup> The agreement provides for a meeting in 1986 concerning reuniting families, and a conference on disarmament in 1984. Sr. Moran considers his success to have helped to avoid the breakdown of the Helsinki process.

#### 4.2 The European Economic Community

Spanish entrance into the EEC is an issue which causes frustration both for the government and for the public. The government is not being blamed because there is already an obvious culprit: France. The government must bear public sarcasm concerning the illusions initially nurtured by the Socialists vis-a-vis their French comrades. Spain enjoys an Associate status with the EEC, which in general has been beneficial to its economy, but it is still treated as an external economic entity. This penalizes it heavily in the sector in which Spain is most competitive, agricultural produce, especially since most Spanish trade is conducted with the countries of the EEC.

The European Council, meeting in June 1983 in Stuttgart, agreed that negotiations for the accession of Spain and Portugal should continue until its finalization and ratification. This, the Council expressed, should be done in concert with the enactment of the new financial policy that was to be approved at the European Council meeting in Athens in December 1983. In that way the reform of the community was linked, as the Spanish government sees it, with Spanish accession. On September 27, the French government vetoed the EEC agricultural document (intended to be a comprehensive restructuring of EEC policies) because it did not include entirely

satisfactory reforms in the financing of Mediterranean produce. French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy blamed "our northern neighbors" for this yeto,<sup>(37)</sup> while the Spanish saw in it the French will to retard the Spanish entrance and therefore protection of the interests of its southeastern farmers. This reading seemed to be evidenced by the insistence France made in previous negotiating sessions that Spanish agriculture be subject to a long period of gradual integration. Exasperated by this foot-dragging, Sr. Gonzalez said in Athens (where he attended a conference of heads of Socialist Governments of Mediterranean countries), "If Spain cannot join the EEC because of a lack of political will of the Ten, Spanish foreign policy will have to change and consider the alternatives."<sup>(30)</sup> That comment kept everybody guessing as to what alternatives to the EEC there might be. None seem to exist, and certainly the government has not expounded on any. One observer criticized the government for its inability to put the Spanish question in the focus of European concerns:

(1) It does not inform public opinion of European diplomatic activities, from which Spanish interests are absent . . . ; (2) it has allowed itself to have been swept aside in efforts to improve the direct dialogue among Felipe Gonzalez, Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand, which is practically nonexistent when national interests are at play . . . ; (3) it lacks its own European framework. When European states make pacts, negotiate, confront, agree -- utilizing all the resources of classic diplomacy (trade and economic pressure, political give and take, military confrontation) -- Spanish interests are literally mortgaged by decisions that foreign capitals may take without even minimum Spanish participation.<sup>(18)</sup>

The government is now stating its expectation to join the EEC by January 1, 1986. This date was first mentioned in a letter Sr. Gonzalez addressed to the Prime Ministers of the ten EEC governments:

As President of the Spanish government, I fear that frustration will dominate my country's public opinion, which harbors serious doubts about the existence of an authentic political will on the part of the Community for the completion of the adherence process.(33)

He expressed the hope that negotiations will end by 1984 and that integration "could be concluded by January 1, 1986." Sr. Gonzalez promised he would never withdraw the Spanish request to join the EEC because he did not want to "alleviate the weight on their consciences."(33)

#### 4.3 Relations with France

As the question of Spanish accession to the EEC is at the central core of relations with France, French-inspired impediments create grave political and economic embarrassment for the government. However, the attitude France adopts vis-a-vis Basque terrorism causes great alarm both in the government and in Spanish society at large. There may be 500 Basque refugees from Spain living in the French Basque region. These are individuals sought by the Spanish police for criminal acts, or who fear they could be arrested in relation with specific crimes. Many of them are directly connected with ETA terrorist groups. These organizations

are part of an apparatus that keeps strong pressure on its followers in Spain to maintain political protest, to provide its death squads with intelligence and to recruit new agents. They man the information network that assassinates, kidnaps, levies the "revolutionary tax" and spies on disaffected individuals. The "revolutionary tax" is cashed in the open in some well-known bars and at beaches in Biarritz and Bayonne. After strong Spanish protests, France has occasionally acquiesced to the temporary deportation of certain terrorists from its Basque region to other French Departments. Spanish requests for extradition of identified terrorists have always been turned down. It is widely accepted in Spain that the ETA staffs are located in France, where they are free to direct ETA's activities.

The excuse given by France is that traditionally it has been a land of refuge. It should be noted, however, that the present French Minister of Justice was formerly a legal counsel for Spanish Basques accused of terrorism in Spain. The Spanish government and society at large resent the fact that this attitude of refusal to clamp down on Basque terrorism does not coincide with that taken by France in regard to German and Italian terrorism; the French have handed terrorists over to Rome and Bonn. It is assumed by almost everyone in Spain that France stands pat in this matter for fear that Basque terrorism would become a major threat to social and political peace in the French Basque region, where separatist movements maintain some activity.

Major Basque terrorist crimes in France have included the assassination of two gendarmes.

The Spanish Foreign Minister had optimistically announced upon his accession to office that Spain and France would coordinate their actions in Europe and Latin America. This proposal encountered only disbelief in Spain, while the Minister was soon faced by the frustrations caused by French attitudes on the matters of terrorism and the EEC, frustrations punctuated by frequent acts of sabotage against Spanish lorries carrying agricultural produce to the European markets through French territory. Periodically, Spanish lorries are assaulted and destroyed on their way through French motorways. Though the payment of compensation by the French authorities is rapid, there is no known case of a saboteur being brought to trial.

Sr. Moran's illusions about France have undermined his prestige. Sr. Gonzalez has meanwhile detached himself from any unfounded expectation. He criticizes France quite openly:

I understand that [in Stuttgart] it was said that one solution to the two problems, the agricultural one and that of the Community budget, would simultaneously mean Spanish admission; depending on Common Market continuity on that agreement, our government accepted this simultaneity as something logical. But now France and, to a certain extent, Greece raise the condition that the Mediterranean fruit and vegetable regulation, which is only a part of the common agricultural policy, can be resolved in advance; Spain is not ready to accept this as linked to Spain's adherence. (30)

The French attitude in this matter is "ambiguous," he added.



Spanish dissatisfaction with France was implicit in the announcement made by the President that "political criteria" would be applied to international purchases. This announcement was made in the midst of speculations about a boycott of French exports to Spain through state commerce -- mainly armament and heavy equipment for nationalized industries. Normally, the different government branches manage their purchases without particular coordination. The new idea was to control purchases in order to strengthen the government's negotiation position vis-a-vis France. By the end of 1983, negotiations were underway for a potential purchase value of \$1 billion. Any retributive measure has to be carefully weighed against the fact that the Spanish trade balance with France is favorable, so the possibilities of economic reprisal are restricted only to the optional purchasing power of the government.

#### 4.4 Relations with Portugal

Sr. Gonzalez's proposition to form a free trade zone between Spain and Portugal, formulated during his visit to Lisbon on November 11, 1983, was politely turned down by Minister Mario Soares; no mention of it is made in the joint communique issued at the end of the visit. Portuguese mistrust of the role Spain can play within the Atlantic Alliance is well known. Portugal does not want the assignment to Spain of certain missions with the NATO command structure to

affect in any fashion its own position and missions within IBERLANT. The freeze of Spanish integration in the military wing of NATO at least postpones this problem.

#### 4.5 Relations with Britain

Though relations with Britain are proper and correct, they are cool and not very intimate. The problem of Gibraltar is the obstacle. On the one hand Britain wants Spain in the European Community in order to countervail French dominance of the EEC and to contribute to the lowering of prices of Spanish agricultural products, which now enter the UK with a certain level of common external tariffs. However, Gibraltar precludes the rapprochement between the two countries. Britain contends that it is bound by the promises extended to the Gibraltarians not to resign sovereignty over the territory without their consent. The Gibraltarians see their support of the Rock's military and naval utility as the key to maintaining their standard of living and revenues. In effect, 65 percent of Gibraltar's gross domestic product is generated by services given to the base, the shipyard, and to the British and Gibraltarian administrations. This last is heavily subsidized by the UK: 62 percent of its workforce is employed by the public sector.<sup>(38)</sup> So, Gibraltarians view with apprehension any potential change in their status as a colony.

Negotiations between Spain and Britain on Gibraltar were agreed upon on April 10, 1980, with the aim of "overcoming all the differences between them on Gibraltar." Both governments were to reestablish direct communications in the region and agreed that "future cooperation should be on the basis of reciprocity and full equality of rights." But it has not been possible to open negotiations as of the end of 1983. Spain claims that certain basic rights of Spaniards are restricted in Gibraltar (to own property, to reside) and Britain claims the agreement provided for the unconditional lifting of all restrictions to direct communication. The British government contends that it is only the Gibraltar government that is empowered to extend those rights to Spaniards, and the Spanish government contends it is the British Governor who, according to the Gibraltar constitution, holds all legislative powers, and could do away with any discrimination. All these claims and counterclaims, together with the unfavorable negotiating climate created by British victory at the Falklands, have led to a standstill. The Spanish government, purely on the basis of humanitarian concern, opened the fence to pedestrian transit in December 1982. Neither the Gibraltar nor the British government reciprocated. It seems that Britain is awaiting the day when Spanish accession to the EEC comes to Parliament for approval: then, the unconditional opening of the barrier can be the condition for a positive vote.

Together with the deep connection between Gibraltar's economy and its military use by Britain, one must consider the Rock's ongoing strategic importance to Mediterranean security. A prime factor underlying the dependence of Gibraltarians is the frequent reference to Gibraltar's significance as a military base. The naval base commander said in 1979 that Gibraltar offered the advantages of being an anchored aircraft carrier, a magnificent surveillance post, and a supply and repair vessel in the Mediterranean. Admiral of the Fleet Lewin said around the same time that the importance of Gibraltar today perhaps exceeded that which it had during the Second World War. The Lord Privy Seal Sir Ian Gilmour later declared in Madrid that the strategic value of Gibraltar "can be appreciated only by looking at a map; its value is no greater for Britain than for its allies." In February 1983, CINSCOUTH Admiral Crowe said the Alliance has "a deeply vested interest in Gibraltar as a viable military base."<sup>(34)</sup> "The dockyard in Gibraltar," he added, "has the only emergency facilities readily available for docking an Allied nuclear submarine in the Western Mediterranean." Gibraltarians' perception of the importance of the base to their well-being is exemplified by this press commentary: "It would be hard for anyone in Gibraltar to claim that he can obtain a livelihood without directly or indirectly supporting a defense economy."<sup>(13)</sup>

Gibraltar's nuisance value should not be overlooked. The Socialists point to the existence of a colonial situation in Spanish territory as one of the obstacles to full Spanish integration in the Alliance. Sr. Gonzalez has said that he would never allow a British admiral in Gibraltar to have command of any Spanish naval forces. However, the question of a British admiral having command of Spanish forces and reporting through a Spaniard is unanswered. It has become known that during the conversations in NATO for the integration of Spain in the military structure, before the Socialist government reached power, the problem of Gibraltar arose several times. This demonstrated that incorporating Spain into the command structure would be a difficult problem even if the position of Gibraltar's subordinate command was set aside. Thus, what is eventually to be a multilateral cooperative effort could be blocked by a purely bilateral problem. However, one must remember that integration is a lengthy process even with the best of intentions to integrate quickly and smoothly.

#### 4.6 Relations with Morocco

The axis upon which Spanish-Moroccan relations hinge is that of the cooperation treaty regularly negotiated between the two countries. Basic features of the treaties have always been (1) Spanish rights to fish within Moroccan jurisdictional waters; and (2) Spanish economic cooperation

with Morocco. There may be at any given day one thousand Spanish trawlers prowling Moroccan fishing grounds. Morocco imposes increasingly strict terms for fishing; concurrently it has increased its demands for economic aid. The long negotiating periods preceding each agreement puts great strain upon bilateral relations. Morocco used the treaties as leverage concerning the Spanish position vis-a-vis the Western Sahara conflict. Moreover, the latest treaty failed to be ratified by the Moroccan parliament (which meets infrequently). Spain uses economic aid as its main leverage. The 1983 treaty provides economic aid of up to 100 billion pesetas (around \$650 million). Another source of tension is the transit of Moroccan oranges through Spanish territory (destined for the EEC). This transit is bitterly resented by Spanish orange growers.

Though economic cooperation between the two countries is not greatly important for Spain, from a political point of view it is essential for Spain to keep good relations with its Maghreb neighbor. "We are condemned to agree," is the motto repeated on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar by the negotiators. The importance of good relations with Morocco is emphasized by the fact that the Socialist government has substantially changed its policy vis-a-vis Western Sahara. When in opposition, Socialists condemned the Madrid Treaty by which the administration of the territory was handed over to Morocco and Mauritania. They recognized the Polisario Front as the true representative of the Western

Saharan people. In power, they have decided not to recognize the Arab Socialist Democratic Republic. Its representatives were reportedly received in a cool atmosphere by the Spanish Vice President when he visited Algiers on March 23, 1983. Altogether, Spanish influence in Morocco has substantially decreased since independence both in political and in cultural terms.

#### 4.7 Relations with Algeria

The tone and the spirit of relations with Algeria changed substantially with President Boumedienne's demise. His successor, Chadli Benyedid, has followed a pragmatic approach to Algerian foreign policies. Boumedienne's ambitions to lead the Third World have been tempered by the new government. Algeria no longer meddles with Spanish national interests by way of promoting phantom Canarian independence movements. Political relations are good; King Juan Carlos visited Algeria in May 1983. However, relations are far from being unproblematic.

Economic relations between the two countries are affected by the misunderstandings arising from an agreement Spain signed with Algeria in 1975 for the annual acquisition, over a period of 20 years, of 4,500 million cubic meters of natural gas. Spain had to pay for the gas independently of whether or not it was taken, the Algerians contend; the Spaniards dispute this point of view. Algeria

now claims a back debt of \$700 million. Prolonged negotiations may lead to a broader cooperation agreement that encompasses a solution to the old problem and opens new avenues of cooperation. There have been discussions about the construction of a gas pipeline between Algeria and Spain across the Mediterranean or, eventually, across Morocco and the Strait of Gibraltar.

The new political climate between the two countries has done away with old suspicions and mutual fear. It is helping to make Algeria an important and growing market for Spain.

#### 4.8 Relations with Israel

Spain and Israel have never maintained diplomatic relations. The origin of this problem is that the state of Israel voted against Spanish entrance in the United Nations, given its political nature and its supposed cooperation with Nazi Germany during World War II. The strongly pro-Arab policy of the Franco regime made it impossible for any move toward Spanish recognition of the state of Israel.

President Adolfo Suarez warmly supported PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Calvo Sotelo was more inclined to recognition, but Arab pressure delayed it until the UCD was voted out of power in October 1982. The Socialists had always maintained close relations with the PLO and Arab "progressive" forces. They were very unsympathetic to the



Camp David agreements. Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon in 1982 prompted the PSOE's Executive Committee to propose to the Socialist International the expulsion of the Israeli Labour Party. Later, the PSOE withdrew this demand.

Once in power, the Socialists saw the nonrecognition of Israel as incompatible with their interest in accession to the EEC. Sr. Gonzalez quickly perceived the importance that relations with Israel would have in Spanish relations with the United States. After he visited Washington in June 1983, it seemed the establishment of relations was impending. Apparently, Arab pressure forestalled this. In any case, the government now wishes to consult with friendly Arab countries before making the decision: "We are friends of the Arabs, but in a short period of time they will have to show they are friends of Spain," said a diplomatic source in October 1983.<sup>(29)</sup>

There is a large Spanish-speaking community in Israel, and cultural and historical links are strong. Economic complementarities call for a close cooperation between the two countries in order to better exploit the commercial chances the EEC offers to Mediterranean agriculture. Israeli foreign policy planners expect that trade with Spain will lead to economies of scale in the production of advanced Israeli technology.

#### 4.9 The Non-Proliferation Treaty

Spain is not a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). No known military nuclear program is under way, although the navy is promoting the idea of building a nuclear-propelled submarine. Spain is undergoing some pressure from European governments to sign the NPT before it joins Euratom. Spanish refusal to sign the NPT "does not mean we are not going to sign it in the future," said Sr. Moran on July 14, 1983, in The Hague.

Press reports attribute to the interministerial commission on defense matters the idea that were Spain to embrace active neutrality, it would need nuclear weapons. Spain has the know-how to build such a weapon but lacks the necessary infrastructure, capital and political will.<sup>(16)</sup>

#### 4.10 Relations with NATO

Spanish policies toward NATO are equivocal enough to allow it to participate in some of its activities while pretending it is not participating. Much of the effort of the Spanish Permanent Representative in NATO is dedicated to clouding the issue. The Spanish attitude toward NATO is noncommittal and choosy. Spanish representatives participate in a few dozen committees of the scientific, political and military branches, among them the High Level Group, the

Special Consultative Group on Euromissiles, Eurogroup, etc. Spain does not participate in the force structure and its commands, nor in matters of infrastructure. Spain has not yet signed certain important NATO conventions, such as the statutes for forces and personnel.

Spain has dissociated itself from the issue of INF deployment. Sr. Moran did not adhere to the final communique of the North Atlantic Council on December 1982 which reaffirmed the dual-track decision. The reason given by a government spokesman was that Spain considered it more honest "not to underwrite the spirit of a document which, inter alia, would involve the sanctioning of the installation of new missiles in Europe." Months later, when visiting Bonn, Sr. Gonzalez expressed his "comprehension" for the decision to deploy the INF.

The official Spanish attitude toward NATO was defined by Sr. Moran in his presentation before the Atlantic Council of December 1982. He made the following points:

1. Spain has signed the Washington Treaty and will remain a loyal ally while in NATO.
2. The military integration process is to be frozen.
3. The government's position on the issue will be adopted after conducting a thorough examination of the defense and security needs of the country.
4. A referendum will be conducted to allow the people to express opinions on the matter.
5. Allies will be consulted before the government adopts a decision.

6. In any case, the government will adopt the modalities of a Spanish contribution to Western defense, which is assured independently of whether Spain remains in the Alliance or not.(53)

Spanish policies toward NATO are the object of bitter criticism on the part of those in favor of the Alliance, and of the sarcasm of those opposed to it. Political commentators and cartoonists are capitalizing on the government's ambiguous attitude. The Soviets have expressed their own confusion about this subject by reporting on "the perplexity" of Spanish public opinion on this matter.(23)

## SECTION 5

### FOREIGN POLICY, NATIONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC OPINION

It is not easy to discern between Spanish opinion makers in foreign policy from those in national security. Anyone in Spain writing or expressing opinions on one aspect is likely to maintain parallel views on the other. Writers and analysts are, however, more proficient and learned on matters of foreign policy. At least, these are the subjects with which they are more familiar, because for many, foreign policy is merely an extension of national policies. However, as the general conditions of security in Europe and in the Western world affect Spanish foreign policy options, it can only be expected that anyone taking a view on these problems must be concerned with general conditions that affect and constrain Spanish security. Writers and analysts are generally considerably less knowledgeable on security matters since these require complex, intricate, and abstruse expertise based on a scientific framework where paradigms are described not only in socio-political but in technological terms. For the most part, Spanish analysts lack the personal experience and academic background to deal with security matters on a responsible or innovative basis.

This does not mean that there are not exceptions owing to meritorious personal or institutional commitment.

But by and large, academic institutions do not impart the necessary knowledge, do not encourage involvement in matters that are viewed as controversial, and in any event do not have sufficient independence to approach security matters as specialized, intellectual challenges. Among all Spanish universities, there is only one chair of international relations. International studies are generally only a part of the international law programs. While there are two chairs of international law (public and private) in every faculty of law in Spanish universities. In these the emphasis is purely legalistic. International relations, broadly defined, has not yet won academic recognition, and therefore security studies has won even less.

Thus, opinion makers on foreign policy and national security attain their professional background in an ad hoc manner which normally comprises a mosaic of experiences in the press, in public lectures, in national and international gatherings and through political debate. Most of the commentators and analysts writing in the media on these matters do so as part of their professional careers as journalists. It is rare that a professional intellectual (a professor, a philosopher) deals with matters of security, although there are exceptions.

The press is the focus of most of the public debate. The quality of analysis made by seasoned professional journalists can be high. Normally those that excel in this task have a long international experience as correspondents;

they are able to speak foreign languages, a skill lacking in so-called "national" newsmen. It is in this sector where one can find the most respected opinion makers in the area of foreign and security policies. It is also in this sector where one finds examples of inept or sectarian professionals enjoying a position of influence among large audiences.

Some leading politicians maintain frequent contact with the public at large by writing articles on security, defense and international problems. In some cases the quality of their writings can be very high, owing to the scholastic or professional background of the particular author. This is not the case, though, with most politicians. In some papers collaboration with specialized writers substitutes for independent analysis. This easy expedient keeps public opinion uninformed and disoriented. There is also a distinct tendency among political parties to pick up some writers that pass as the party "experts" in security and international relations. They are given public office as soon as the party wins the elections, independent of their intellectual merits. These minions of power are distinctly biased in their approach to national defense, security and international relations, and are useful only for keeping the faithful indoctrinated with the party's basic tenets.

Real influence in the media is not exerted by writers or journalists, but by those enjoying the editor's or the publisher's confidence. Though in most Spanish newspapers

there is no real bias for any particular editorial line on security, there are a few where one individual or group keeps strict control over the editorial comments on security, defense and international relations. This is clearly true of the most influential media, most of which are located in Madrid. In these papers, a certain ideological orientation is a clear feature.

Obtaining influence through the control of the editorial line is even more critical in television. In Spain, television is government-owned. There is only one network (apart from the tiny Basque television, controlled by the regional government) with two national channels and one "regional participation" channel. It is in television where it is necessary to look for the most influential journalists and editorialists. Ideological control of television has been a decisive factor in Spanish political life for many years, especially since the democratic process began.

It can be said that the left is prominent in the press, both in news reporting and editorials, though right- and center-oriented newspapers are also important. Leftist control of television has been a fact for many years, since Adolfo Suarez, carried away by his populist policies and his preference for consensus politics, allowed the left to control the network's information services.

Beyond the media, there is an extensive fringe of individuals and pressure groups that are very active in



mobilizing public opinion on many matters, including, naturally, security. Demonstrations, staged protests, meetings, etc., are their trade. Meanwhile, the armed forces maintain certain activities designed to keep the public informed about their institutional aims. It has already been pointed out that some officers write columns presenting their personal views, or that of their services, on problems of defense and security. Outreach programs are a novelty for the armed forces; they are on the rise.

Opinion polls are becoming another distinct feature of the opinion-making process in the area of security and defense. It is not only that polls represent a given state of opinion, but also that polls produce an impact that contributes to the shaping of public attitudes, and consequently policies.

A short review of each of the above-mentioned features of the Spanish opinion-making process may facilitate the placing of Spanish threat perceptions, security and foreign policies in their proper perspective.

#### 5.1 Intellectuals and the International World

There are few Spanish intellectuals who write about international and security matters. Two should be mentioned

although they do so only occasionally: Julian Marias, a philosopher of the Ortega y Gasset school; and Jose Maria de Areilza, former Foreign Minister, former President of the Council on the European Assembly, and a brilliant writer. Social scientists write frequently on comparative politics and social developments, without necessarily entering the realm of security policies.

Professors are attracted to international politics if they are politically committed to a certain ideology. One example is Ramon Tamames, a communist who left the party to become the guru of the Spanish "green" movement; he propounds Spanish neutrality. Roberto Mesa is a strenuous defender of progressive "Third Worldism"; while one must also mention Professor Pedro Schwartz, a politician of liberal inclinations.

## 5.2 Universities

Mention has been made of the fact that there is only one chair of international relations in all of Spain. This is held by Professor Manuel Medina, an American-trained political scientist. He is a Socialist, and holds the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. He publishes very little, although he has directed the Revista de Estudios Internacionales, put out by the official Instituto de Estudios Constitucionales. This review is the main outlet for Spanish academic research and literature on international studies. However, its

circulation is very small and it is not influential in any conceivable meaning of the word. Professor Medina is assisted by Professor Roberto Mesa, who has written extensively on Third World affairs. He writes in the press about national liberation movements.

Professor Angel Vinas chairs one catedra of economic history. He is a Socialist, and Executive Advisor to the Foreign Minister. He has written extensively on Spanish-American relations, and has lectured on the secret clauses of the 1953 Bilateral Agreement. He now specializes in nuclear strategy. Another prominent academic is Professor Antonio Marquina, who is conducting thorough research on American and Allied war plans concerning Spain and the Maghreb during the Second World War. He teaches contemporary history.

Professor Tomas Mestre teaches Latin American history. He has written extensively on Africa and Latin America. He is a close observer of the security implications of foreign policies in the Third World. Other major academics include Professor Julio Busquets, and Professor Maximiliano Bernad. Professor Busquets is a Socialist, a former army officer, and a military sociologist. Professor Bernad teaches constitutional law and directs the Catedra Palafox, an organization which specializes in military and security matters.

None of these professors is particularly influential in shaping Spanish policies, except perhaps Professor Medina. They are important, however, in maintaining a degree of student and public interest in security and international matters.

### 5.3 The Press

The only newspapers and periodicals with influence in shaping public opinion on security and foreign policies are published in Madrid. Barcelona newspapers are influential in economics and in internal political life, but not in other subjects. Here follows a brief review of Madrid newspapers with particular attention to their editorial line on security and foreign affairs.

#### 5.3.1 ABC

Conservative daily paper. Strongly pro-West, actively anti-Soviet. Its leading writers are: Alberto Miguez (foreign policy and NATO affairs); Salvador Lopez de la Torre (Africa and NATO); and Manuel Blanco Tobio (international affairs).

#### 5.3.2 El Pais

Self-appointed diario independiente de la manana. Its editorial line is controlled by Sr. Javier Pradera, former Communist Party member. It is strongly anti-NATO, fairly neutralist, clearly pacifist. Views expressed by

Soviet leaders are more likely to be read in El Pais than anywhere else. Strong anti-American bias. Some of its journalists take more moderate views, including Sr. Juan Roldan, diplomatic correspondent (clearly pro-NATO) and Carlos Yarnoz (military affairs). El Pais is the paper with the largest circulation in Spain.

#### 5.3.3 Ya

Catholic newspaper. Its circulation is in decline. One influential writer is political commentator Emilio Romero, who is critical of socialist policies. One brilliant and experienced writer is Augusto Assia.

#### 5.3.4 Diario 16

Centrist publication with aggressive reporting. Normally takes pro-Alliance stance. It has well-informed writers on Cuban and Central American affairs.

One Barcelona newspaper should be mentioned:

#### 5.3.5 La Vanguardia

It has the largest circulation in Barcelona, though it is declining. It has lost influence on the national level. One columnist, Colonel Francisco Lopez de Sepulveda, is an expert on security matters, nuclear strategy, etc. It shares with ABC the services of Alberto Miguez, who is thus one of the most widely read diplomatic correspondents.

Certain periodicals are also worth noting:

5.3.6 Cambio

Owned by the same publisher as Diario 16, it has the widest circulation for general information. Generally pro-West, pro-NATO, and strongly anti-Soviet. One of its leading writers is Antxon Sarasqueta.

5.3.7 Tiempo

General information. Strong bias against NATO. Its diplomatic correspondent, Pablo Sebastian, is pathologically anti-NATO.

In the party press it is only worthwhile to mention two periodicals:

5.3.8 El Socialista

Official weekly party magazine. Very naive, sectarian and incompetent on security and international matters. Very shallow reporting and biased analysis. Anti-NATO, pacifist, anti-American. One leading Socialist politician in Madrid said recently, "I feel ashamed of El Socialista."

5.3.9 Mayo

A monthly which represents the leftist wing of the Socialist movement.

There are no significant centrist or rightist political periodicals.

#### 5.4 Political Parties and Public Opinion

Some leading political figures treat security and foreign affairs matters in the press. They are also continuously interviewed by TVE on their opinions regarding these matters in the process of news coverage. The most prestigious writers with a respected intellectual background are: Manuel Fraga, opposition leader; Javier Ruperez, former Ambassador to NATO and a leading political figure of Partido Democratico Popular (which is rightist); Fernando Moran, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Guillermo Kirkpatrick, foreign affairs spokesman of Alianz Popular (the main opposition party).

Another well-known writer is Elena Flores, Socialist Party international relations spokeswoman. It has been reported that she instructs diplomats posted to Central America on the Socialist Government's policies. Also of importance is Luis Yanez, the director of the Instituto de Cooperacion Iberoamericana. He is a former Secretary of International Relations of the Socialist Party. He writes and speaks in favor of a Latin American destiny for Spain, and has sponsored the 1983 Encuentros en la democracia with leading Latin American democratic and leftist personalities. The Instituto publishes the Cuadernos Iberoamericanos, a serious and impressive review. The Instituto sponsors the writings and travels of some promising Latin American intellectuals in exile, and occasionally some less promising sectarian writers.

## 5.5 The Electronic Media

Television Española plays a critical role in the opinion-making process. The director of the Servicios Informativos is a key appointment for any director general of Radiotelevision Espanola (RTVE). This last figure is appointed by the RTVE council of administration, which is formed by representatives chosen by political parties according to their parliamentary representative. The current director general of RTVE is Jose Maria Calvino, a long-term republican who does not belong to the Socialist Party. He initially appointed as director of Servicios Informativos Jose Luis Balbin, a prominent journalist with clearly defined leftist leanings, who has been accused of entertaining Soviet sympathies. By mid-1983, Sr. Calvino replaced Sr. Balbin with Enrique Vazquez, a dedicated journalist with clear sympathies for Third World radical causes, and distinctly critical of American foreign and Security policies. Pablo Sebastian, mentioned above, is the director of one of the news programs.

## 5.6 Radio

There are no influential newscasters that deserve mention in the security and foreign affairs areas. Each radio network maintains a news and comment program, filled only with interviews and guests' opinions.



## 5.7 Defense and International Studies Institute

Two study centers are worth mentioning. One is an armed forces institution and the other a private civilian organization. The Centro de Estudios Superiores de la Defensa is a military college where high-ranking officers are trained. Its professors contribute their personal views to the development of defense doctrines. It organizes joint courses on defense with government officials for the study of security needs. These activities are not public. The Center has an Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos, which is a group open to civilians at large. The IEIE organizes numerous seminars where professors, journalists, and industrialists are invited to contribute substantial research. This Institute has organized formative courses on national defense for journalists and for the universities. It also publishes a "Boletin Informativo," a strategic abstract.

The private institute is the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales (INCI). It functions primarily as an encounter center, although it does as much research as its finances allow. It has a membership of 200. Its chairman is a respected independent public figure (don Antonio Garrigues). Its board of directors is formed of a mix of party-aligned members and independents, the latter being in the majority. Sr. Fernando Moran also belongs to the board of directors. The Institute is financed by the members'

fees, and grants from American and Spanish foundations; however, the Socialist Government has withdrawn the support given by former governments. INCI has organized five international seminars on European and African security problems, Spanish defense options, the decolonization of Gibraltar, and international terrorism. It publishes books and monographs.

#### 5.8 Opinion Polls

The opinion poll that conducted in 1983 and published in June that year on "Spanish Public Opinion on NATO" is worth mentioning. It was authored by the Center for Sociological Research of Madrid. The poll took into account previous public opinion polls conducted by the now defunct Instituto de la Opinion Publica. Among its more relevant findings are the following:

- o While in July 1975, 57 percent of the people consulted thought it would be positive for Spain to join the Alliance, only 40 percent maintained that view by January 1976. Within the same timeframe, those believing that Spain should remain outside the Alliance declined from 24 percent to 17 percent. In January 1976, the proportion of those reserving their opinion on the subject reached 43 percent, while the proportion of June 1975 had been only 19 percent.
- o "In later years, and especially from 1978 on, it can be observed that the Spanish population was inclined towards a more marked division of attitudes on Spanish entry to NATO, which is observed in the continuous decrease of those not responding. In October 1978, those reserving their opinion on the

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
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
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[subject] were 58 percent." This proportion descended to 28 percent by June 1983.

- o The proportion of those who wanted Spanish entry has changed from 27 percent in October 1978 to 17 percent in June 1983, while in the same period the number of those not willing, or showing little wish to enter, has increased from 15 percent to 56 percent.
- o "The reasons invoked primarily by those opposed to the Spanish presence in NATO make reference to the risk of war and the danger of storing nuclear weapons; the invocation of economic reasons and political principles is lesser."
- o "At the present moment, when Spain has already joined the Alliance, the proportion of those who believe that a referendum should be called about our presence in NATO stands at 69 percent (as of March 1983), while 10 percent are opposed."
- o However, "given the complexity and the forms of adherence to NATO, a majority of the consulted Spaniards believe that before the referendum is held the advantages and disadvantages of entry" should be explained. "Only 7 percent of the consulted persons find themselves to be perfectly informed."
- o "In the soundings made before May 1982, when Spain became the 16th member state of the Alliance, a decreasing tendency among those voting in favor of entry may be observed, while the number of those against it increased." Specifically, in September 1981 the polls show that only 12 percent of those consulted were willing to vote for entry into NATO, while 37 percent were against it, 11 percent would abstain, and 40 percent did not know/did not respond.
- o "On the other hand, the date of the latest poll, made in June 1983, shows what could be the beginning of a reversal in the attitudes of Spaniards vis-a-vis NATO entry. For the first time since 1978 the percentage of those shown to be in favor of entry climbed several points, while the proportion of those against was reduced by one point." The June 1983 percentages are the following: in favor of full Spanish participation in NATO, 17 percent; against it, 56 percent; do not know/ do not respond, 28 percent.

## SECTION 6

### IMPLICATIONS FOR SPANISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS, NATO AND EUROPE

The implications of the Socialist Government's foreign and security policies for its relations with the United States, Europe and NATO are not far-reaching as long as Spain does not leave the Atlantic Alliance. The particular "progressive" outlook of Socialist policies is not incompatible in any way with close relations with the United States and with Alliance aims. Adjustments will be necessary before Spain can become a fully integrated, participatory member of the Western community. This could easily develop in a relatively short period of time with assured NATO membership, allowing the Spanish government to operate within the European system with more self-confidence (reduced today by the uncomfortable position of being an "aspirant" to European political and economic cooperation). This self-confidence would no doubt strengthen its internal prestige and add legitimacy to the "forces of change" the government says it represents. That could contribute to the success of the armed forces' reforms, which, according to the Minister of Defense, require support for two full legislative terms, or a period of time of eight years at least. A more stable democratic Spain, in full cooperation with European defense, would be more likely to come to a better and permanent understanding with Washington.

Were Spain to leave the Alliance, Spanish accession to the EEC would be further complicated, prohibiting Europe from completing the full course of integration. Regional and bilateral relations between Spain and the EEC members would suffer permanent strains. The question may be raised whether a Spain not belonging to NATO could in fact become an EEC member. Even if this were politically convenient for Spain, it is doubtful whether it would be acceptable to the other EEC partners (for which common defense is a shared concern with NATO obviously being the defensive structure upon which they rely).

Spanish Socialist policies do not seem to be putting Spanish-American relations under any unendurable stress. On the contrary, they seem to be working smoothly on what concerns the core of this relationship, the Cooperative Agreement, though differences and misunderstandings exist in peripheral areas such as Central America and the Middle East. A more detailed examination of the implications of the Socialist Government's policies in this context is necessary.

#### 6.1 Implications for Relations with the United States

The Spanish Government feels confident that its policy toward NATO does not create any problem for the bilateral relationship with the United States:

The understanding shown by Reagan for the referendum [on the NATO issue] seems to be closely related to the announcement made . . . by President Gonzalez [from which it is assumed that the government] may consider useful for national defense needs a certain degree of integration within NATO, which he will propose to the Spanish people.(31)

It seems apparent to some observers that the official Spanish position on NATO will be used as leverage in dealings with Washington:

His [Gonzalez's] strategy is much more sophisticated: what he is warning the Americans in particular, and the Westerners in general, that either the Atlantic Alliance resolves seriously to help Spain with its economic problems regarding entry into the Common Market, and concerning the problem of Gibraltar, or the Spanish people undoubtedly will vote "no" in the referendum.(15)

Some message in this vein may very well have been communicated to Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz in their meetings with their Spanish counterparts. It has been reported that the latter was sensitive to the Spanish position on Gibraltar as presented to him by Sr. Moran:

In his meeting with Moran, Shultz, according to the former, understood the Spanish position and promised that in a meeting he is going to have with Secretary of the [British] Foreign Office, he will invite the British government to make its policy more flexible and initiate a new round of Madrid-London negotiations.(25)

In any case, the Socialist Government wanted to decouple the NATO membership question from that of bilateral relations with the United States when it insisted in adding to the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement of July 2, 1982, a protocol by which:



- o no clause or disposition of the agreement predetermines the question of Spanish integration in the military structure of NATO;
- o each government reserves the right to initiate, any time, the procedures for revision or modification of the Agreement, in accordance with the provisions of Article 6.3;
- o the Spanish government may decide in the future to change its status in regard to the Atlantic Alliance, in which case the pertinent texts will be reexamined by both sides, again in accordance with Article 6.3.

This protocol was attached to the Agreement on February 24, 1983.

The Spanish wish to distinguish the Agreement from any NATO-related context is understood by the United States, which will abstain from exerting any pressure to the contrary, according to the comments made by one Spanish official close to the follow-up negotiations on the Agreement. At the Spanish-American Joint Committee meeting in Washington, in October 1983, Secretary Shultz commented that this was the best moment ever in the bilateral relationship. Sr. Moran affirmed that relations were good and that he expected them to become even better. This proves, one Spanish official said, that American fears that the relationship would be harmed by its past association with the Franco regime were unfounded. For example, the Joint Military Committee continues to conduct joint planning with Spain in matters of common military exercises. This implies close cooperation between the JUJEM and the JUSMAAG.

Characteristic features of the new Agreement include Spanish consent to American rights to use certain support installations (instalaciones de apoyo, IDAS in its Spanish acronym) in relation to the defense of the West, and certain "authorizations of use" (autorizaciones de uso, ADUS) for any other military use, or for usage of additional facilities. Also, Spain reserves the right to veto the visit of nuclear-propelled ships (submarines or aircraft carriers). It seems that the United States has not asked Spain for authorization for use of its facilities (for air transit, air signals, road traffic, port usage, etc.) in relation to the presence of U.S. forces in Lebanon. This does not imply that Spain has denied such authorization, but rather that the United States did not request it. Spanish solidarity with the American peacekeeping presence in Lebanon was implicitly expressed when Spain sent its condolences to the U.S. government for the terrorist attack against the marine headquarters, whose importance was recognized.

Military cooperation has greatly progressed in the wake of the renewed Agreement. In July 1983, Secretary Weinberger exempted Spain from the "buy American act"; this will facilitate the sales of Spanish-made military items to the United States, although such sales are still subject to specific legislative prohibitions. A Committee for Industrial Defense Cooperation has been formed between the two countries, pursuant to a portion of the Agreement. New

programs are currently being incorporated under the provisions of the agreement. Another substantial advance in regard to prior agreements has been the extension to U.S. military personnel stationed in Spain of Spanish jurisdictional rights. Formerly it was the Minister of Justice who decided whether or not to waive Spanish jurisdiction; now it falls to the Spanish judicial system to decide.

One area of potential disagreement between the two countries concerns divergent policies on Central America. Madrid has provided its good offices to intercede between the different actors in the Central American drama. The principles inspiring the Socialist Government's activities have been expounded by Sr. Gonzalez in this fashion:

At this moment [December 1982] there is a very tense situation there that could predicate that sort of conference which I have called "the little Helsinki" for the Central American region and the Caribbean. There is no stable solution to the problem that does not involve all parties; not only the Central American ones, including Panama, all of which are the most involved, but also Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and even some countries of the Andean pact which have shown their willingness to register the sort of pressure needed for peace negotiations and security for the region. We also have the Caribbean countries and, of course, the United States. There are no loose pieces in that Central American puzzle. The U.S. interests are not only the subjective ones of a powerful country that wants to control a certain area in accordance with its security interests; they also are objective strategic interests that include the future of the Panama Canal. On the other hand, the Cuban situation cannot be omitted from this context. History has demonstrated that the Cuban embargo has not produced any beneficial effect for any side. It was not a wise decision. Now the

opportunity arises to change the direction of that strategy of total isolation in order to enter into another one of compromise with Cuba in a project for peace and security for the region.(21)

The tone of, and the ideals behind, this declaration could not be further from the American perceptions on the subject. Less than two months after taking office, the new Socialist Administration found it difficult to implement the idea of a "little Helsinki"; hard political realities demonstrated to the Socialists the need to scale down their high expectations. Sr. Moran presented his diplomatic strategy in a fashion that resembled diplomacy solely through "good offices":

The idea of a little Helsinki is complex in its execution; unhappily it does not seem to me, personally, that it can succeed immediately; we must be sincere, the little Helsinki depends fundamentally on the United States and on its relations with Cuba. If Cuba imposes on itself a discipline, a self-discipline, and if the United States is ready to accept that not all situations in Central America are black or white . . . , that not all of them should be considered exclusively in an East-West context, it would be possible to derive a detente that could result in something beneficial for all . . . but this rests fundamentally with the United States. Now, we are going to work in that direction, without sticking exclusively to the project of a multilateral conference; we are going to work in different ways, bilaterally with certain countries, bilaterally with the United States, bilaterally with Cuba, bilaterally with the Central American countries, and with those of the Contadora meeting.(3)

The pretense that the solution to the crisis depends fundamentally upon the United States is actually charged with political innuendo. Sr. Gonzalez has been outspokenly

critical of the United States in this context: "its leadership has a negative dimension that is greater than the positive one; it is necessary to reverse this trend."<sup>(4)</sup>

Although the United States seems to have shown patience with this criticism, that is not the case with Panama and Venezuela, whose leaders have done everything possible to demonstrate displeasure with what they see as Socialist leniency towards Marxist-Leninist forces in Central America.

Still, the Spanish government's diplomatic plan for Central America seems to center on gaining adherence to the Contadora framework by the regional actors, the United States and the NATO allies.

## 6.2 Implications for NATO

The Socialist Government is doing its utmost to reassure European countries of Spanish loyalty to the defense of the West. "Spain is going to make its contribution to Western defense . . . NATO is quiet for the moment because it knows Spain is not going to raise any problems in this year of the Euromissiles."<sup>(22)</sup> Spanish withdrawal from NATO "would constitute a grave loss for Spain, for the Alliance, and the North Atlantic Assembly," said the report presented to the Assembly by Ton Frinking.<sup>(28)</sup> According to this report, "the southern region of NATO is no longer a flank, but a main front, given oil transit and the contribution of each country to the security of the Atlantic

Alliance."<sup>(28)</sup> Spanish withdrawal as a consequence of the government's decision after a negative referendum would not shatter the foundations and structures of common defense, but would discredit the Alliance, and would mean a major political victory for the Warsaw Pact.

### 6.3 Implications for Europe

In the security domain, it must be said that the reserved Socialist posture towards NATO has provided Spain the opportunity to strive for closer bilateral military cooperation with a number of European countries. There has been a great upsurge of military exchanges with several European armed forces; military cooperation agreements have been signed with France and Greece; the Spanish Chiefs of Staff have visited several European countries, and have hosted some Foreign Chiefs of Staff as well as the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; while joint exercises have been conducted with French and West German forces. Though the PSOE political programs proposed the signing of such bilateral defense agreements with European countries as an alternative to NATO membership, these agreements are no longer viewed in that fashion, but rather as an incentive to the growth of indigenous Spanish military industries. Thus, they may be regarded not as a substitute for integration, but rather as its foundation.

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## APPENDIX

### SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT REGARDING DEFENSE OPTIONS IN SPAIN

Until recently, little attention has been paid by Spanish political parties to defense and security issues. This might explain the lack of comprehensive analyses on matters such as defense/deterrence and nuclear strategy. Thus far, the debate has revolved around the question of whether or not Spain should integrate into the Atlantic Alliance, and, if it should, to what extent and under what circumstances such integration should proceed. The result of this focus has been to place the discussion of strategic policy in Spain on an elementary level, unjustified by the complexity of factors that play a role in the study of defense and security issues.

The following analysis, therefore, will set forth an overview of the different schools of strategic thought in Spain, based on an examination of the electoral platforms and resolutions of political parties, parliamentary debates and public statements made by the parties and their principal leaders. From these sources, three fundamental schools of thought can be identified: (1) Atlanticist; (2) Western-oriented; and (3) Neutral.

## Assessment of Schools of Thought

### 1. School I: Atlanticist Current

#### 1.1 Political Parties

In this school, the following can be included:

- o Alianza Popular (AP)
- o Partido Demócrata Popular (PDP)
- o Convergencia Democrática de Cataluña (CiU)
- o Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV)

#### 1.2 Common Features

The political parties represented in Parliament that maintain this posture share these common goals:

- o Complete integration of Spain into NATO
- o Opposition to holding a referendum on Spain's current membership

If a referendum is nevertheless held, they would favor a formula that would imply full integration into NATO's integrated military command after the negotiation of certain conditions, including:

- o No decisive linkage with EEC and Gibraltar issues
- o Opposition to storage and/or building of nuclear facilities on Spanish soil

- o Preference for a multilateral defense approach rather than a bilateral one
- o Backing of NATO's double decision on missile deployment in West European countries.

### 1.3 Specific Features

In addition to the common features we have mentioned above, each of these political parties has particular stands and characteristics that should be emphasized:

#### Alianza Popular (AP)

Founded in 1977

Principal Leaders: Manuel Fraga, President  
 Jorge Verstringe, Secretary General  
 Guillermo Kirkpatrick,  
 Spokesman for Foreign Affairs

In coalition with the PDP, it is the largest opposition group in the Spanish Parliament with 106 in Congress and 54 in the Senate. In the 1982 general elections, it obtained 5,412,401 votes, which represents 23.35 percent.

- o According to its 1983 electoral platform, AP's main goal is "to complete the integration of Spain into the Atlantic Alliance." (1)
- o There is no reference in the program to the bilateral agreement with the United States, but criticism is raised against those who oppose NATO and at the same time "favor bilateral

agreements that move Spain away from neutral and Third World positions." (2)

- o Its Atlanticism does entail a rejection of neutral attitudes conceived as "inhibiting behavior of foreign policy." Moreover, AP criticizes the "dichotomy, not always well established, between neutral and warlike postures." (3)
- o AP underlines a "willingness for a full commitment to the West and a policy of complete integration into Europe." (4)

Thus, regaining sovereignty over Gibraltar "which was not possible with an isolated Spain" constitutes a fundamental claim that "should be put forth constantly in our integration into the Atlantic Alliance." (5) Likewise, the AP's leadership considers that full integration into NATO is the most adequate response to defense problems in Spain and the best way to defend Ceuta and Melilla.

#### Partido Demócrata Popular (PDP)

Founded in 1982

Principal Leaders: Oscar Alzaga, President  
Javier Ruparez, Vice President  
and Spokesman for Foreign  
Affairs  
Julen Guilmon, Spokesman for  
Defense Affairs

- o For the PDP, NATO contributes multiple advantages to Spanish defense in terms of defense guarantees, multilateral equilibrium and "positive change in the nature of our relations with Washington." (6)

- o Their criticism of the Socialist Government's policy has characterized it as: "clumsy, hasty, and full of verbal incontinences, doctrinaire rationalizations and contradictory signals." (7)

Taking a Socialist explanation of the freeze in the conversations for integration in NATO's military command, the PDP concludes that the government "does not want nor does it know how to offer our allies a formula with which Spain would fulfill its commitments under the Washington Treaty." (8)

The negotiations and signing of the Protocol to the Treaty with the United States has also been subject to criticism:

"The aim seems to have been to assure the maintenance of bilateral relations with Washington at the risk of jeopardizing even Spain's permanence in NATO, ignoring the obvious disadvantages of a bilateral relationship in terms of the furthering of multilateral relations within the Alliance." (9)

- o On a more conceptual level, the leadership of this party has questioned the doctrine of autonomy for the sake of autonomy, by putting forth a series of questions such as "autonomy with respect to what or whom?", and "what degree of autonomy?" (10)

#### Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya (CiU)

Catalan regional party in coalition with UDC  
(Christian Democratic oriented)

Principal leaders: Jordi Pujol, Secretary General;  
Miguel Roca, Spokesman at the  
Congress, in Madrid

It holds 12 seats in the Congress and 7 in the Senate.

In the 1982 general elections, it obtained 794,554 votes which represents 3.8 percent of the total.

- o For CiU, NATO is not an exclusively military Treaty, but a political instrument as well. This is the basis of the CiU position which favors a consolidation of Spain's presence in the Western world through full integration in NATO.
- o To call a referendum as a procedure in joining the Alliance, the CiU argues, "is not the only democratic method, nor is it even the most democratic." (1)
- o The reasons for its strong support for NATO lie in the convenience of fully incorporating Spain into the European model of a democratic society, and in the need to increase security because it reduces risk. The Catalan Party states that: "the bilateral Treaty with the United States incorporates our country into the defense mechanisms of the Western world with all of the risks which this might entail and without any of the advantages." (12)
- o With regard to the nuclear issue, CiU has opposed the storing or the installation of the Alliance's nuclear weapons on Spanish soil.

Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNU)

Basque regional party, belonging to the Christian Democratic International.

Principal Leaders: Carlos Garnaicoechea, President  
of the Regional Government  
Javier Arzallus, Secretary General  
Marcos Vizcaya, Spokesman in the  
Congress

It holds 8 seats in the Congress and 7 in the Senate

In the 1982 general elections it obtained 406,804 votes, which represented 1.9 percent of the total.

- o In the 1981 general debate in the Spanish Parliament on the issue of the Alliance, the PNU had supported holding a referendum following the decision to join. This would help, according to this party, to reduce distrust or insecurity in public opinion. The PNU also saw here the opportunity to clarify an issue which is badly understood by the public.
- o The PNU considers that the Spanish situation is characterized by a complete alignment to Western defense "through NATO's back door, the wrong door," by means of its bilateral treaty with the United States. This leads it to conclude that: "the fight for peace and disarmament will be more effective within NATO rather than outside." (13)
- o They favor a complete nuclear free zone in Spain and the ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

#### 1.4 Political Weight

An assessment of the parliamentary representation which brings together all of the parties that might join this atlanticist school of thought would indicate the relative political weight of this tendency. One should add to the aforementioned the number of seats held by UCD. This party (which has been dissolved and whose representatives have gathered around the so-called "Centrist Group") has maintained well-known political positions on the matter of NATO membership and Spanish defense. In the Congress, out of 350 seats, the parties following School I would hold 138 seats, representing 39.4 percent. In the Senate they would hold 72 out of 206 seats, representing 35 percent.



## 2. School II: Western-oriented School

### 2.1 Political Parties

- o Partido Socialista Obrero Espanos (PSOE)
- o Centroa Democratico y Social (CDS)

### 2.2 Common Features

- o Acceptance of Spain's Western and European orientation
- o Spain's current membership in the Atlantic Alliance should be revised by holding a referendum to decide between different defense options
- o Linkage between the Atlantic question and pending negotiations in European affairs (EEC and Gibraltar)
- o Maintenance of the bilateral agreement with the United States
- o Rejection of any kind of nuclear involvement in Spanish territory

### 2.3 Political Weight

According to the parliamentary representation, out of 350 seats, the PSOE holds in the Congress 202 seats and the CDS 2, that is, 58 percent. In the Senate, the PSOE holds 133 out of 206 seats, or 64 percent.

## 2.4 Variables of the Western-oriented School

In this school, even though there are some common features, one should consider three different variations in their specific stands.

### 2.4.1 Conditional Full Integration Option

Within this school, one should include the political platform of the CDS, as well as some leaders of the PSOE.

#### Central Democratico y Social (CDS)

Founded in 1982

Principal leader: Adolfo Suarez, former Prime Minister

It has 2 members in the Congress. In the 1982 general election it obtained 615,540 votes; this represents 2.88 percent of the total.

- o The electoral platform of this party maintains that a point of departure for foreign policy would be an agreement among the political forces to define "after a fundamental long-term agreement" (14) the establishment of a "firm, clear-cut position in all international affairs." 915)
- o Without mentioning the relationship with the United States, the CDS emphasizes with regard to the Atlantic Alliance the necessity of a "negotiation that would link Spain's full participation to the fulfillment by our future allies of a series of pending demands -- e.g., Gibraltar and integration into the EEC -- that depend precisely on sovereign decision by members of the Alliance." (16)

### PSOE's Social Democratic Wing

Within the PSOE's moderate wing, which would include some members of the Socialist Government, one of the most representative leaders is Mr. Enrique Mugica, member of the PSOE's Executive Committee.

In a recent statement, Mr. Mugica, who is Secretary in charge of Studies and Programs for the party, has shown, even though he appears to be cautious and prudent, a more open posture regarding the NATO question than his party formerly did. He favors an assessment of NATO "not based on passionate rhetoric and demagogic perspectives, but, rather on rationality inspired by knowledge of the context." To this aim, he states that: "It is inexcusable to differentiate between the North Atlantic Treaty and the military organization to which we don't belong. It must be considered that nuclear missiles are not going to be deployed in Spain in any case, and the only missiles that are aiming at us are in the Communist countries. Also, the treaty with the United States and the links we have accepted in Parliament, it seems to me, are desirable and should be taken into consideration. One must assume that belonging to the West is not only a geographic fact, but also a pattern of civilization which deserves to

be defended. And based on this we should decide what is most favorable to us."<sup>(17)</sup>

To the question of whether he favors a government recommendation in support of NATO prior to the referendum, Mugica's answer is: "Anything you might ask me on this matter would be found in my previous responses." With all the necessary reservations and avoiding any useless speculation, one can conclude that this type of statement reflects the general attitude of this school of thought.

#### 2.4.2 The Theory of "Realismo Vinculante"

The "realismo vinculante" is a pragmatic approach which accepts the inevitability of being linked to the West. Those who favor this approach would advocate a formula of Alliance participation, temporarily similar to that which France has maintained since its withdrawal from NATO's military command.

It would be a matter of recommending the maintenance of the present status in the proposed referendum, keeping Spain's current membership in the Alliance, but remaining outside of any military commitments. All of this would be conditioned upon a

breakthrough in the negotiating process with the EEC and Great Britain.

This formula would allow the government to overcome the obstacle of the referendum and at the same time to save face before the electorate. The possibility of full integration into the NATO military structure at a later date would not be discarded. A shift toward this position can be detected in the statements of the Socialist Government since it took office. This seems true, especially in view of the statements made by President Gonzalez on the occasion of his last trip to Washington.

Without going into details regarding the change in tone, it would be useful to review some of the actions which serve to illustrate the Socialist Government's increasing flexibility.

- o The continuity of the joint bases as a basic element of the bilateral relationship with the United States, which has not been submitted for revision. The speed with which the Protocol of the treaty was negotiated, and the fact that the basic text of the Accord was maintained, contrasts with the developments in the recent negotiations between the Greek Socialist Government and the Reagan Administration.
- o The presence of members of the Spanish government at the various meetings of the Atlantic Council and of the different committees of the Alliance, such as the Eurogroup, the Committee on Defense Planning and the Committee on Nuclear Planning. It is also useful to note that France does not attend the meetings of some of these committees.

- o The backing given to the position of the United States and the NATO allies on Euromissiles deployment, based on NATO's double-track decision.
- o The final decision favoring the purchase of F-18s which the Socialists had criticized when proposed by the former Spanish Administration.
- o The announcement made by the Defense Minister that Spain would participate in certain joint exercises with NATO's allies. One must note, however, that this has been a usual practice prior to Spain's joining the Alliance.
- o The fact that Spain maintains an Ambassador to NATO, and contributes to the regular budget of the Alliance.
- o And, last but not least, the postponement of the referendum until 1985 which contrasts with previous announcements.

This set of facts indicates a rapid evolution toward a more flexible posture and suggests that the government is on a different course from that of its own party, which remains doctrinaire. An interministerial committee, moreover, is elaborating a document which is likely to support this flexibility. The group of experts which forms this committee is composed of the following: The General Director for Security and Disarmament Affairs, Carlos Fernandez-Espeso; the General Director for U.S. and Atlantic Affairs, Jose Allendesalazar; the Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Angel Vinas; and aides in the Cabinet of the Minister of Defense. The group is familiar with what is at stake in terms of Spanish defense and is unlikely to have any prior ideological conditioning. In

this sense, it is probable that they will put forth a compromise formula within the narrow margin offered by a realistic defense option.

The terms of such a compromise might place the government's recommendation for the referendum half way between withdrawal and full integration. This formula could be swallowed, in an early stage, by the grassroots of the party, as long as it was endorsed by the personal prestige of the Party Secretary General, who, at the same time, should offer advances on other European issues. This analysis falls within the logic of the President's own statements, in which he argues that: "I have never opposed NATO but I have never wanted Spain to commit itself to NATO." (18) Elaborating on this theme, he has stated further that "to join NATO unconditionally is neither reasonable nor logical given the country's national interests. Spain should not renounce its quota of responsibility in Western security, but should accept this according to the procedure that it determines through its own sovereignty." (19) In his last trip to Washington, Felipe Gonzalez also referred to the possibility of different gradations of membership in NATO, by which he might be indicating a desire to maintain the current situation as a temporary framework. (20)

The infrequent public statements made by the Defense Minister also indicate a flexible policy within a pragmatic

approach as a "necessity for adaptation to the reality of each moment." (21) Even though he has explicitly referred to the "French way," the genuine implications of this reference would have to be interpreted in the context of other references, such as his statement that: "Spain finds itself linked, and should be even more so, to the countries with an established tradition of democracy." (22)

#### 2.4.3 Autonomist School

This variant is found in the recent programs of the PSOE and in the public statements of some of its leaders, especially Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Moran.

The basis of this trend is the desire to obtain a greater degree of autonomy, allowing room for maneuvering in Spanish foreign policy. To accomplish this would require opting for that contribution to Western defense which would not constrain Spain's margin of autonomy. In the words of Mr. Moran: "The crux of the situation is: faced with a world divided into blocs is there not room for an independent posture? Why should it be denied to us, not only in NATO but also in the Western world, to establish our own position in the Western world?"<sup>(23)</sup> This reasoning might lean toward a recommendation to withdraw from the Alliance, while maintaining, in their present terms, bilateral relations with the United States, as well as



concluding defense agreements with other European countries so as to maintain the specific benefits which an autonomist policy entails.

Despite the abundance of ambiguities in the public references made by those who advocate this trend, one of its principal leaders, Mr. Alfonso Guerra, Vice President and Deputy Secretary General of the PSOE, who had already made a stand against Spain's remaining in NATO in a future referendum,<sup>(24)</sup> has been even more explicit in recent statements, underlining that: "Spain should not stay in NATO, it should withdraw."<sup>(25)</sup> The autonomist school ultimately defends a greater degree of autonomy for the other European countries as well. This is defined within the context of the old idea of a European system which allows a wide and flexible margin of autonomy for obtaining its own objectives, "without falling into the oversimplification that all relations and all situations in the world can be reduced to the West-East conflict."<sup>(26)</sup>

A reference also is necessary to the autonomism-neonationalist connection. Since arrival of the PSOE to power, their complacent acceptance of the label "young nationalists"<sup>(27)</sup> has not been hidden. This neo-nationalism sentiment is conceived in terms of the breakdown of Spain's "inferiority complex" in the international arena and a forceful defense of its own national interests.

### 3. School III: Neutralist School

Even though in the variants of School II elements of neutralism arise, it is necessary to single out as a separate current the position of those groups and political parties which stand in favor of neutrality without reference to Spain's belonging to the West.

#### 3.1 Political Parties

The groups and political parties that can be considered within this School are:

- o Izquierda Socialista (IS), a wing within the PSOE
- o Partido Comunista de Espana (PCE)
- o Euskadiko Ezquerria (EE)

#### 3.2 Common Features

This current has the following particular features:

- o Rejection of NATO
- o Denial of foreign bases on Spanish soil
- o A foreign and defense policy outside of the blocs

#### 3.3 Political Weight

Taking into account the difficulty of determining the parliamentary weight of the Socialist deputies and senators

who are part of the IS, the sum of the seats of PCE and EE in the Congress is 6, or 1.7 percent.

### 3.4 Doctrinal Background

#### Izquierda Socialista (IS)

The members of the PSOE who form part of this tendency do not occupy relevant positions in the government or in the Executive Committee of the party. This tendency operates within the PSOE as a quasi-organized wing with some margin of autonomy. Its origin goes back to 1979, the time when the division arose between those who followed the official line and held the management of the party, and those who criticize this state of affairs.

Principal Leaders: Pablo Castellanos, Luis Gomez Llorente, and Francisco Bustelo

- o In response to government policy, IS has recently denounced "the ambiguity and surprisingly understanding attitude of the government toward the deployment of Euromissiles." (29)
- o With regard to the referendum, it has asked the government to put forth "a clear question on which the Spanish people can express themselves without ambiguities." In preparation for this referendum, IS has asked for "an active campaign to be undertaken by its own party in favor of Spain's withdrawal from NATO." (30)

One of its principal leaders, Mr. Pablo Castellanos, President of the Justice Committee in the Congress, has been even more outspoken:

We would like that in the matter of international relations the government be more categorical. I do not share the theory of "realismo vinculante," by virtue of which we would have to remain in NATO. A majority of Socialists votes are pacifist votes, and that should be reflected by a neutralist decision."(31)

Members of the IS form part of the Movement for Peace, Disarmament and Freedom (MPDL), a pacifist group which defends unilateral disarmament. This organization has participated along with other political and social groups in public demonstrations in support of dismantlement of the American bases in Spain and of reducing the military budget.(32)

Linked to the positions of the IS is the Juventudes Socialistas (Young Socialists), the youth organization of the PSOE, which has joined the calls which criticize NATO, oppose U.S. bases in Spain, and denounce the President's statements on Euromissiles.(33)

#### Partido Comunista de España (PCE)

Founded in 1920

Principal Leaders: Gerardo Iglesias, Secretary General  
Santiago Carrillo, former Secretary General  
Dolores Ibarruri, President

In the 1982 general election, the PCE obtained 824,978 votes, representing 3.8 percent of the total. This contrasts with the Party's 1979 showing, when it obtained 1,911,217 votes, or 10 percent of the total.

- o The heading of the PCE's 1982 electoral platform constitutes a proclamation of its foreign policy: "For a neutral Spain in a peaceful world." (34) In support of this policy of independence and nonalignment with respect to blocs, the PCE proposes that the government call for a referendum "within 6 months," in which it will seek "a vote against remaining in NATO such that Spain might regain its neutrality." (35)
- o Regarding the bilateral agreements with the United States, the PCE stresses that Parliament "should take a stand against the renewal of these agreements by means of which foreign bases exist on our soil. And as long as these bases remain, all of the bases should depend exclusively on the Spanish military." (36)
- o With regard to nuclear issues, the PCE insists that: "Spain should be a totally nuclear free zone. There should be no nuclear armaments in our territory. Such arms should not pass through Spanish ports or airports nor should planes carrying nuclear arms overfly Spanish territory." (37)
- o Such enthusiasm for denuclearization leads the PCE to propose a nuclear-free Mediterranean. (38)

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